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CAUSAL CHAINS AND STATISTICAL LINKS:
THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
IN HAZARDOUS-SUBSTANCE
LITIGATION
Troyen A. Brennant

Many commentators recognize proof of causation as the paramount obstacle to just resolution of tort claims based on injury from
toxic substances.'

Causation has thus become the focus of a

number of essays and investigations. 2 Some authors have argued
persuasively for a restructured tort law system that could compen-

sate hazardous-substance injuries appropriately. 3 Others maintain
that common law courts cannot cope with the sophisticated social

and scientific problems raised by such injuries. 4 The latter group
argues that a regulatory agency could better resolve hazardous-substance-induced injury claims. 5
The debate between those who support modifications of tort
law doctrine and those who support an administrative approach to
t Instructor, Harvard Medical School, and Lecturer, Harvard Law School. B.S.,
Southern Methodist University, 1975; M.A., Oxford University, 1978; M.P.H., M.D.,
J.D., Yale University 1984.
This Article is based on research supported in part by the American Law Institute.
Views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official views
of the American Law Institute.
The author appreciates the comments of Paul Weiler, Richard Stewart, Geoffrey
Hazard, and Wendy Warring.
I See Pierce, EncouragingSafety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33
VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1298 (1980); Trauberman, Statutory Reform of"Toxic Torts'" Relieving
Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Iictim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177,
197 (1983).
2
Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 779 (1985); Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-FactRules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Note, Pursuinga Causeof Action in Hazardous Waste Pollution Cases, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 533 (1980).
3 Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984); Note, Toxic Substance Contamination: The RiskBenefit Approach to Causation Analysis, 14 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 53 (1980).
4 Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Lau, Liabilityfor Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HoFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981); Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy:
Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985); Note, EnvironmentalHealth: An Analysis of Available and ProposedRemediesfor Victims of Toxic ll'aste
Contamination, 7 AM.J.L. MED. 61 (1981).
5 See Pierce, supra note 1, at 1320-21; Trauberman, supra note 1, at 215.
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6
hazardous-substance injury has continued throughout the 1980s,
but has produced little in the way of legislative initiatives or judicial
activism. 7 This inaction most likely results from the inability of
judges and law-makers to discern a clear advantage between common law solutions and regulatory approaches. Meanwhile, there are
increasing signs of courts' inability to grasp scientific evidence of
causation. 8
Deciding between common law modifications and a regulatory
approach might be facilitated if one alternative appeared clearly superior for resolving causation issues. Hazardous-substance litigation presents a myriad of procedural and substantive problems. 9
Discussion of these issues may, however, detract from an analysis of
the central problem of the courts' difficulty with resolving toxic-substance-caused injury. Thus, in this Article, I heed the following advice from Professor Fleming James:

What is needed is a separation between the issue of cause and all
the other issues, which are often meritorious in themselves but
too frequently parade meretriciously in the guise of cause. Perhaps this would affect substantive results only a little, but it would
contribute much to clarity of thought.10
In both legal and scientific reasoning, causation is an epistemo6 Congress initiated the most thorough discussion of alternatives to tort litigation
as part of the original Superfund legislation. See SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY
GROUP, SENATE COMM. ON THE ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES
AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WAsTEs-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter SUPERFUND STUDY]. A blue-ribbon committee

convened by a not-for-profit organization produced a similar study. See KEYSTONE
CENTER, POTENTIAL APPROACHES FOR Toxic EXPOSURE COMPENSATION: A REPORT ON
THE CONCLUSIONS OF A KEYSTONE CENTER POLICY DIALOGUE (1985) [hereinafter KEYSTONE REPORT].

7

There are indications that a hybrid approach to asbestos-induced disease com-

pensation may be developed. See Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Vanagement of a Public
Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-85). Moreover, as jury awards to victims of
hazardous substances increase, industry may actively support new, perhaps more rational, approaches to hazardous substance injury compensation. See Skeen v. Monsanto

Chem. Co., Nat'l LJ., Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 1986) ($100,000,000
jury verdict for benzene exposed worker who died of leukemia).
8 See infra notes 130-71 and accompanying text.

9 See generally Goggin & Brophy, Toxic Torts: Workable Defenses Available to the Corporate Defendant, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1208 (1982-83) (theories for recovery keep increasing
while defenses decrease; procedurally, patterns ofjury instruction vary greatly); Shelton,
Defending Cancer Litigation: The Causation Defense, 24 FOR DEF. 8 (1982) (discussing difficulties that defendants face in toxic substance litigation); Trauberman, supra note 1, at
189 (discussing problems arising from long latency periods); SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T
AND PUB. WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic
SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND
TEXAS (Comm. Print 1980) (detailing difficulties that victims have in gaining

compensation).
10 James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 811 (1951).
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logical construct that allows one to investigate the unknown and to
define and overcome uncertainty. Legal notions of causation, however, differ in important ways from scientific causal concepts. Hazardous-substance litigation exaggerates these differences, and
therefore often produces results that neither satisfy the goals ofjustice nor demonstrate an understanding of scientific knowledge. In
this Article, I clarify the differences between legal causation and the
scientific concepts of causation that underlie the evidence linking
hazardous substances with injuries. I then argue that these differences do not permit just and efficient resolution of hazardous-substance-induced injury claims through tort litigation. I conclude by
outlining the regulatory apparatus that could provide compensation
for, and internalize the costs from, hazardous-substance-caused
injuries.
At the outset, I outline the roles of causation and uncertainty in
the epistemology of scientific investigation. The evolution of the
philosophy of science has produced a different understanding of the
relationship of uncertainty to investigation than existed a century
ago. More important, the causal concepts that derived from
Newtonian physics are quite similar to those that inform the law,
although they are no longer essential to science. Thus, by tracing
the evolution of the philosophy of science, one can juxtapose legal
and scientific notions of causation.
I then apply insights gleaned from an analysis of this evolution
to a discussion of the legal theory of causation. The function of causation in law is not simply to imitate current scientific knowledge;
rather, the law uses causal concepts not only to link events, but also
to provide moral prescriptions. Thus, attempts to combine the nonNewtonian causal concepts used by scientists with the legal notions
of causation can produce disastrous outcomes, as my analysis of case
law demonstrates.
Only a thorough understanding of the specifics of scientific uncertainty and causation can lead to the best formula for compensation and deterrence of hazardous-substance injury. After
developing a framework for classifying the uncertainty involved in
toxic-substance injury, I evaluate the advantage of a regulatory approach over common law tort actions for dealing with causation
problems. Then, by analyzing several case studies, I corroborate
conclusions that the theoretical model of uncertainty suggests.
My analysis focuses on hazardous-substance injury. I define a
hazardous substance as a product, environmental pollutant, or occupational exposure that produces a disease process in human be-
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ings." This definition cuts across legal distinctions between
products liability, environmental, occupational safety, and nuisance
law.12 The use of this broad definition is justified if the evidence
used to link such substances to disease is similar enough to suggest
generic approaches to compensation and deterrence.
I
THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE PROBLEM

Proposing sweeping changes in the law is justified only if the
problem is large enough to warrant such an effort. Is the threat represented by hazardous substances great enough to require reformulation of tort law, such as Rosenberg proposed,' 3 or the
development of a regulatory structure such as that proposed by the
Superfund Section 301(e) subcommittee?' 4 In the last ten years a
large number of law journal articles have made gloomy predictions
and called for various reforms.' 5 Although the legal system has
adopted few, if any, of these reforms, the system has not collapsed,
nor are there clear indications of a current epidemic of hazardous
substance-produced injury. Why then should the legal community
be concerned?
There is no easy answer to this threshold question. Occupational toxins, environmental contaminants, and unsafe consumer
products can cause an overwhelming variety of diseases including
birth defects,' 6 an assortment of pulmonary diseases,' 7 skin dis-

I' See infra text accompanying notes 172-74. Others have presented a different topology of toxic substance. See Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978). I avoid discussion of toxins that produce economic or aesthetic injury without harming human life. See Halter & Thomas, Recovery of Damages by
States for Fish and Wildife Losses Caused by Pollution, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 5 (1982); Wood,
Requiring Polluters to Pay for Aquatic Natural Resources Destroyed by Oil Pollution, 8 NAT. RESOURCES L. 545 (1975).
12 This Article centers on the generic causation problems presented by hazardous
substances, regardless of the legal doctrine under which they arise. Certainly, hazardous
substance causation problems arise under many different doctrines. See SPECIAL COMM.
ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM,

AM. BAR ASS'N, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY:

THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT
LAW (1984).

13 Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 916-29.
14 See SUPERFUND STUDY, supra note 6, part IV, at 196-246.
15 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 1; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 4; Trauberman, supra
note 1.
16 Anesthetic gases produce birth defects in laboratory rats. See Fink, Shepard &
Blandau, Teratogenic Activity of Nitrous Oxide, 214 NATURE 146 (1967). Female operating
room personnel have a higher incidence of spontaneous abortions. See Ad Hoc Committee on the Effect of Trace Anesthetics on the Health of Operating Room Personnel,
American Society of Anesthesiologists, Occupational DiseaseAmong Operating Room Personnel, 41 ANESTHESIOLOGY 321 (1974).

17 Asbestos is the most frightening example. See infra notes 215-31 and accompanying text. Coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a serious cause of morbidity in coal mining
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eases,' 8 neurological disorders, 19 heart diseases, 20 blood dyscrasias, 2 1 and gastrointestinal disorders. 22 Diseases caused by these
substances produce an almost inestimable amount of morbidity and
mortality.
Hazardous substances also cause cancer. Cancer is the second
leading cause of death in this country. In 1984, cancer caused
roughly 400,000 deaths. 2 3 Although the magnitude of morbidity
and mortality represented by cancer is huge, the critical question for
this inquiry is, what proportion of cancer does exposure to hazardous substances cause? Indeed the extent to which control of environmental and occupational carcinogens will significantly decrease
the incidence of cancer has become a central issue in the debate
24
over alternatives to tort litigation.
The extent to which exposure to hazardous substances causes
cancer is a subject of great debate. In a widely-cited study, Barth
and Hunt asserted that environmental phenomena induce 85-90%
areas. See Carpenter & Cochrane, Death Rates of Miners and Ex-miners With and Without
Coalworkers' Pneumoconiosis in South Wales, 13 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 102 (1956). Silica
causes debilitating silicosis in exposed sandblasters. See Samimi, Weill & Ziskind, Respirable Silica Dust Exposure of Sandblasters and Associated Workers in Steel Fabrication Yards, 29
ARCHIVES ENvTL. HEALTH 61 (1974). Grain workers and farmers develop reactive airway
disease after chronic exposure to organic dusts. See Chan-Yeung, Schulzer, MacLean,

Dorken & Grzybowski, Epidemiologic Health Survey of Grain Elevator Workers in British Columbia, 121 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASES 329 (1980).
18 Occupational toxins cause a wide variety of skin diseases. See H. MAIBACH & G.
GELLIN, OCCUPATIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL DERMATOLOGY (1982).
19

Various solvents and heavy metals cause difficult-to-detect behavioral and neuro-

logical disorders. See Allen, ChemicalNeurotoxins in Industry and Environment, in 2 THE NERvous SYSTEM: THE CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 235 (D. Tower ed. 1975); Feldman, Hayes,
Younes & Aldrich, Lead Neuropathy in Adults and Children, 34 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY
481, 483 (1977).
20
See Herd, Lipsky & Martin, Cardiovascular Effects of 1,1,1-Trichloroethane, 28
ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 227 (1974).
21
Benzene is the best recognized hematological toxin. See Askoy, Erdem & Dincol,
Leukemia in Shoe-Workers Exposed Chronically to Benzene, 44 BLOOD 837 (1974). Other substances will also damage blood cells. See Crawford, Aplastic Anaemia Due to Trinitrotoluene
BRrr. J. MED. 430, 431 (1954).
22 See Cohn, Boylan, Blanke, Fariss, Howell & Guzelian, Treatment of Chlordecone (Kepone) Toxicity with Cholestyramine, 298 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 243 (1978).
23
See 2 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S.

Intoxication, 2

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,

1984, pt.

A, at 226 (1987). Of this total, approximately 121,000 deaths resulted from lung cancer,
38,000 from breast cancer and 17,000 from leukemia. See I V. DEVITA, S. HELLMAN & S.
ROSENBERG,

CANCER:

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY

168 (2d ed. 1985).

Twenty-five years of progress in cancer chemotherapy, radiation therapy, oncological
surgery and cancer biology have done little to blunt crude or age-adjusted incidence
rates. Some writers have suggested that research shift from treatment to prevention.
Bailar & Smith, ProgressAgainst Cancer?, 314 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1226 (1986).
24 See Huber, Safety and the Second Best. The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 300-01 (1985).
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of all cancers. 2 5 Another important study, filed with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), conservatively estimated that occupational carcinogens alone accounted for 20% of
cancer mortality. 2 6 In perhaps the most influential article of its type,
Doll and Peto attacked the OSHA report and estimated that occupational carcinogens cause only 4% of cancer mortality 27 and environmental carcinogens cause somewhat less than 4%.28 The mandate
to reform tort law would be overpowering if it could save 300,000
lives per year; it is somewhat less so if only 32,000 lives are at
29
stake.
The imprecision of estimating the impact of environmental and
occupational carcinogens derives from the central uncertainty surrounding the nature of carcinogenesis. Like the study of toxicology
in general, the lack of clear insights into the disease's molecular basis hampers the study of carcinogenicity.3 0 Cancer biologists have
developed useful hypotheses of carcinogenicity, some of which are
now guiding potentially useful research. 31 Nonetheless, the statement by a group of experts convened by the International Agency
25 P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES
AND DISEASES 84 (1980).
26 See NATIONAL CANCER INST., NATIONAL INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH SCIENCES & NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, ESTIMATES OF THE FRACTION OF
CANCER IN THE UNITED STATES RELATED TO OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS 1 (1978); cf SENATE
COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., HEALTH EFFECTS OF TOXIC
POLLUTION: A REPORT FROM THE SURGEON GENERAL AND A BRIEF REVIEW OF SELECTED
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS WITH A POTENTIAL FOR HEALTH EFFECTS 19

(Comm. Print 1980) (finding that magnitude of health risk created by toxic waste to
general population really not known).
27 See Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of
Cancer in the United States Today, 66J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191, 1244 (1981).

28

Id. at 1251.

29

Estimates are that some 400,000 deaths result from cancer each year. See supra
note 23 and accompanying text. If environmental factors cause 80% of cancers, as
Barth and Hunt suggest, then 320,000 deaths each year are due to environmental carci-

nogenesis. Using the Peto and Doll estimate, environmental and occupational factors
account for approximately 8% or 32,000 of the 400,000 cancer deaths.
30
Since the turn of the century, scientists have been unraveling cancer's molecular
basis. Important steps have included: discovery of the differences between direct carcinogens that do not require any in vitro metabolic activation; characterization of some
carcinogens as initiators, substances that change normal cells into cancerous ones, and
other carcinogens as promoters, substances that cannot alone cause cancer, but if preceded by an initiator would enhance the cancerous response; and, more recently, analysis of the genetic machinery of cells, the double-stranded helix of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) that makes up chromosomes. See Smuckler, Chemicals, Cancer and Cancer Biology,
139 WJ. MED. 55, 71-72 (1983).
31
These efforts have given rise to at least two hypotheses concerning carcinogenesis. In the somatic mutation hypothesis, substances disrupt the double helix of DNA,
causing aberrant production of proteins which then cause cells to become malignant.
The epigenetic hypothesis states that chemical disruption occurs further 'downfield' after ribonucleic acid (RNA) is processed from DNA, but before the RNA provides its
signals to protein manufacturing ribosomes. See Cooper, Cellular Transforming Genes. 218
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for Research on Cancer (IARC) in 1980 remains true today: "the
mechanisms by which chemicals induce cancer and the developmental stages from initial exposure to frank neoplasia are poorly
32

understood."
Given this central uncertainty regarding the cause of cancer,
any statement about the role of any agent as a carcinogen is hedged
with assumptions and hypotheses. Because scientists do not yet understand the molecular model of carcinogenesis, it is impossible to
state that a given carcinogen caused any individual tumor. With statistical information, however, scientists can estimate the proportion
of preventable cancers. 33 Using this type of information, Doll and
Peto have estimated that 75-80% of cancers in the United States are
4
avoidable.3
The debate then turns to which cancers are preventable and
which carcinogens should be controlled. Avoidable causes of cancer
include diet, tobacco and alcohol use, environmental and occupational carcinogens and unsafe consumer products. Some scientists
have argued that dietary carcinogens, for instance, are more deadly
than occupational or environmental carcinogens. 3 5 Those who oppose tort reform or new regulations use these estimates. They argue that the keys to prevention are tobacco and dietary education,
rather than law suits against chemical manufacturers. 36
This debate, and indeed the larger debate over the threshold of
SCIENCE 801 (1982). These remain only working hypotheses, but they have produced
some new areas for research in molecular carcinogenicity. See infra note 174.

See INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 295 (1980) [hereinafter IARC REPORT].
32

LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM SCREENING ASSAYS FOR CARCINOGENS:

33
Indeed, we have to rely on probabilistic evidence. See infra notes 149-70 and
accompanying text. Over the past fifty years, it has become clear that there are large
differences in the incidence of specific cancers in different geographic locations. Doll &
Peto, supra note 27, at 1198. Moreover, it is now clear that migrants from one area to
another usually reflect the new region's cancer rates. Id. at 1200. In addition, changes
in incidence over time have been observed, usually correlating with changes in the local
environment or living conditions. Id. at 1201.
34 Doll & Peto, supra note 27, at 1205.
35 See Ames, Dietary Carcinogensand Anticarinogens, 221 SCIENCE 1256 (1983). But cf
Epstein & Schwartz, Fallaciesof Lifestyle Cancer Theories, 289 NATURE 127 (1981) (scientific
basis for lifestyle theory of cancer causation is scanty).
36 See Huber, supra note 24, at 278. Huber suggests that our society is overly focused on public risks, and not appropriately cognizant of private risks. Id. at 278. This
kind of criticism is also made by those who argue that Americans are perversely risk
averse in some areas. See M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY
ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 151 (1982). These criti-

cisms are not without merit. Nonetheless, it is in some ways proper, given the political
nature of our state, to emphasize public risks. A liberal state protects a certain sphere of

liberty, a negative freedom for the individual. See infra notes 43-45. Hazardous substances, as defined herein, trespass on that liberty. Smoking or dietary choices do not.
Thus, in terms of liberalism, emphasizing curbs on public risks makes sense.
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mortality necessary to justify restructuring the law, does not change
the proposals I set out in this Article for three reasons. First, even
Doll and Peto's conservative estimate of the mortality caused by environmental and occupational carcinogens3 7 suggests that these carcinogens cause some 30,000 preventable cases of cancer each year.
Without a doubt, our legal system should make every reasonable
effort to pursue the laudable goal of preventing these deaths. Moreover, legal institutions should ensure that the firms or parties that
produce the carcinogens internalize the costs for these preventable
deaths, and that the families of the victims of these carcinogens are
compensated appropriately. Thus, even the most conservative estimate of the carcinogenic threat posed by hazardous substances
presents a challenge that the law cannot ignore.3 8
The second reason for reforming tort law, independent of the
exact size of the threat that hazardous substances pose, involves
economic predictability and corporate stability. Tort litigation,
largely because of the courts' difficulties with scientific evidence,3 9
produces inconsistent resolutions of claims deriving from the same
hazardous substances. One claim for benzene-induced leukemia
can produce an award of $2,800, while another produces a
$100,000,000 award for the plaintiff. 40 Such inconsistency disrupts
long-term corporate planning and drives insurance companies away
from enterprises. 4 ' As a result, even a conservative estimate of hazardous-substance-induced disease presents sufficient motivation for
reforming existing law from the industry's point of view.4 2
See supra note 29.
Huber himself, despite his emphasis on private risks, refers to the devastation at
Bhopal, which was the culmination of a public risk. See Huber, supra note 24, at 301. See
also Iyer, India's Night of Death, TIME, Dec. 17, 1984, at 22.
39 See infra notes 118-70 and accompanying text.
40 See Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 A.D.2d 281, 188 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1959), rev'd, 8
N.Y.2d 277, 168 N.E.2d 811, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1960). Cf Skeen v. Monsanto Chem.
Co., Nat'l L.J., Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 1986). Small variations in
jury awards present no problem. The problem arises from huge variations around the
mean recovery, which vitiates any predictability in awards.
41
See, e.g., Sparrow, Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage: Unexpected Past, Uncertain Future, 64 MICH. B.J. 169 (1985); Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
555 (1985). There are now very few firms offering environmental liability insurance.
Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liabilityfor EnvironmentalDamage and Its Impact
on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REV. 101, 116 (1985).
A subsidiary issue arises in products liability litigation. Manufacturers argue that
their main problem is not inconsistency of verdicts, but unforeseen changes in products
liability law. See generally Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability Law, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 14; Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable
Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983).
42
Asbestos may produce 8,000 deaths per year. 1 V. DEVITA, S. HELLMAN & S.
ROSENBERG, supra note 23, at 109. This constitutes about 1-2% of the 400,000 cancer
deaths that occur annually. Nonetheless, these deaths have caused serious dislocation in
the insulation industry, not to mention the victims' extended families. See Winter, Asbes37

38
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The third reason why the proportion of preventable deaths and
illnesses due to hazardous substances should not determine whether
we undertake reform of common law tort doctrines is that we live in
a liberal state. The liberal state guarantees a certain amount of liberty, a set of prerogatives that the individual controls. 43 This "negative freedom," as Berlin has termed it, should be protected from
encumberment.4 4 The individual, on the one hand, has negative
freedom to smoke, to eat certain foods, and to expose him- or herself knowingly to certain risks. On the other hand, negative freedom guarantees that the individual should not unknowingly expose
him- or herself to the risks of hazardous substances at home or at
work. As such, it makes little sense to argue that private risks such
as smoking, however deplorable from a public health point of view,
represent reasons for not controlling public risks such as environmental carcinogens. 4 5 Liberalism requires that we seek measures to
reduce exposure to hazardous substances when we have not assented to those exposures, no matter what the size of the threat
46
from the exposures to which we have assented.

los Legal 'Tidal Wave'Is Closing In, 68 A.B.A. J. 397 (1982). Thus, even a relatively small
threat can produce pressure for alternatives to litigation. See Wellington, supra note 7.
43
See generallyJ. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Watts & Co. ed. 1929) (1859). The liberal state
celebrates the rights of individuals. As Ladd has noted, "As a matter of fact, the persuasive influence of lawyers in American public life-as noted by perceptive observers since
de Tocqu'eville-reflects the principles of individualism, free enterprise and constitutional government characteristic of our polity." See Ladd, Legalism and Medical Ethics, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL ETHics 1, 18 (J. Davis, B. Hoffmaster & S.
Shorten eds. 1978).
44
I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1970). As Berlin so succinctly expressed it:
The first of these political senses of freedom . . . which I shall call the
'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What is the
area within which the subject-a person or group of persons-is or
should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference
by other persons?' The second, which I shall call the positive sense, is
involved in the answer to the question 'What, or who, is the source of
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this
rather than that?'
Id. at 21-22.
45
Public health policy must attempt to overcome those causes of disease that affect
many similarly situated individuals. Nonetheless, we must recognize that a liberal state
values individual prerogatives and that as a result, the utilitarian calculus is not straightforward. Mill believed that "[aill errors which [the individual] is likely to commit against
advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to
what they deem his good." See MILL, supra note 43, at 94. Thus, under our current
polity, ensuring that a nuclear power plant does not trespass on others' lifestyle is simply
more politically acceptable than banning smoking.
46 Recognition that we live in a liberal state does not mean that individual tort litigation is the only way to protect negative freedom. Regulatory efforts can also guarantee liberty. See infra notes 272-92 and accompanying text.
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II
CAUSATION AND UNCERTAINTY IN LAW AND SCIENCE

A. The Evolution of Causation in the Philosophy of Science
The courts' difficultly with handling evidence linking a hazardous substance to a disease is largely the result of the courts' inability
to understand scientific notions of causation. The assumptions that
courts make about causation very much resemble those that provide
the foundation for Newtonian physics. Over the past century, science has come to rely on new assumptions about cause and effect.
These new assumptions have not been integrated into legal reasoning. As a result, lawyers and judges are often confused when they
address scientific causation issues.
A review of the evolution of causation within the philosophy of
science helps expose the nature of this confusion. Newton introduced quantitative mechanics to physics, revealing the consistent
operation of the laws of motion and acceleration in a variety of phenomena. 47 Locke best explicated the epistemological framework
that accompanied these insights. He postulated the existence of
fundamental particles in which inhered the "primary qualities,"
qualities that were the objects of perception. 48 Among these primary qualities was the power of one object to produce a change in
another. Newtonian physics limited this power to a change in direction of particles following a collision. Thus, this theory limited cau49
sation to mechanical contacts between particulate objects.
Because incidents could be expressed mathematically, it followed
that causation, too, simulated the rational structure of mathematics.
This characterization of causation as collisions that follow the physical laws defined by mathematics and Newtonian physics is known as
"corpuscularianism."50
47
A discussion of Newton's contributions to physics is the proper starting point for
tracing the evolution of the notion of causation in science. Newton's work helped to
explain a variety of natural phenomena: falling objects, tidal actions, and cannon trajectory amongst others. See generally R. HARRY, THE PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE (1972) (examining many scientists' theories); M. BUNGE, CAUSALITY: THE PLACE OF THE CAUSAL
PRINCIPLE IN MODERN SCIENCE 59 (1959) (discussing Newton's law of motion-force
equals mass times acceleration). These mechanical concepts of causation may be those
that courts and the nonscientific public use when considering causal issues. The court's
understanding, however, is salient in that the court must address scientific issues as

presented by experts-the judge and jury cannot simply refuse to accept scientifically
valid arguments. This tension between everyday views of causation and scientific causation is the focus of this paper.
48 See J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 555-56 (P. Nidditch ed. 1975) (4th ed. 1700); see also J. BENNETT, LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME: CENTRAL
THEMES (1971).
49
50

See R. HARRP, supra note 47, at 131.

See D.

BOHM, CAUSALITY AND CHANCE IN MODERN PHYSICS

36 (1959). Corpuscu-

larians believed that mechanical laws had general validity and that the entire universe
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In the late nineteenth century, Mach outlined a corpuscularian
theory of science that incorporated elements of positivism.5 1 Posi52
tivism is the belief that scientific knowledge unceasingly expands.
Mach's disciple, C.G. Hempel, produced the most thorough description of this synthesis. 53 Hempel's discussion is interesting because
the positivism-corpuscularian philosophy of science outlines many
of the assumptions that underlie Newtonian physics. Courts, if not
scientists, use these assumptions to understand scientific evidence.
Hempel argued that a scientific theory was merely the relationship between a covering law, defined as one of a general set of deconsisted of nothing but particles obeying the tenets of Newtonian physics. It followed
that any previously unexplained phenomena could be reduced to an essence of particles
and physical laws. Causal descriptions would follow from mathematical descriptions of
mechanical events.
The reduction of causation to its essential nature initiated by Locke was completed
by David Hume's radical empiricism. Hume argued that because there is no possible
perception of causal primary qualities, causation must be thought of as a matter of habit
on the part of the observer. See D. HUME, ENQUIRIES 80-96 (P. Nidditch 2d ed. 1902)
(1778). The linkage of two events in a causal framework did not represent a necessary
connection for Hume, because the linkage itself was imperceptible. Hume's attack on
causal powers did little to loosen the dominance of Newtonian physics and corpuscularianism in science, but it did present the critical issue for epistemology and provoked
Kant's Transcendental Deduction.
In the Critiqueof Pure Reason, Kant sought to find answers for Hume's empirical nihilism. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 55, 606-07 (N. Kemp-Smith trans. 1929) (2d
ed. 1787). Kant argued that, before any perception was possible, man had to posit his
own existence. This initial step demonstrated that a person's experience was not only
perception of sensory data, but also a set of posited ordering concepts. Causation was
one of these ordering concepts. According to Kant, causation was a theoretical construct that allows comprehension of phenomena. Such theoretical constructs were not
perceived, but rather were conceptual and belonged to the category of noumena. See T.
WILKERSON, KANT's CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: A COMMENTARY FOR STUDENTS 180-200
(1976).
51
Mach incorporated positivisitic notions into a corpuscularian theory of science in

the late 19th century. See E. MACH,

POPULAR SCIENTIFIC LECTURES

(T. McCormack trans.

1895). Mach argued that noumenal aspects of knowledge could not be profitably discussed; that the only reliable mode of knowledge was the scientific mode, based in mathematics; and that science unceasingly explained the unknown. Thus Kant's insights into
the role that theoretical constructs play in ordering perceptions was lost. Moreover,
Mach celebrated Hume's emphasis on the empirical, while ignoring the nihilism of his
skepticism. Mach's positivism dominated the philosophy of science until the middle of
the twentieth century, largely because of its common sense appeal and faith in scientific
progress. See M. BUNGE, supra note 47, at 68-69.
52
Positivism is the theory that empirical natural sciences perfect knowledge. See
Greene, Biology and Social Theory in the Nineteenth Century: Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer,

in CRITICAL

PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

419-46 (M. Clagett ed. 1959). In the

late 18th and early 19th centuries, scientific discovery and discussion continued at a
remarkable pace. Drawing on Comte's work, philosophers and scientists alike argued
that science would come to explain all phenomena and resolve all social and scientific
questions. Id. Positivism was the term used to describe the belief in the unceasing advance of science, and the belief that science would overcome all questions.
53
C. HEMPEL, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 331-410 (1965).
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ductive principles, and an explanadum, the phenomenon that the
covering law was to explain.5 4 The relationship was formally logical,
but Hempel expressed it in causal terms. 55 Thus, deductive causal
analysis, as defined by covering laws, connected and explained phenomena. Deductive reasoning produced logical relationships between events, essentially enrolling phenomena into causal chains.
The covering law-explanadum model leads to the following corollaries. First, science progresses as deductively derived causal
chains develop from applying covering laws to more phenomena.
Uncertainty results from a phenomena without applicable covering
law. Second, scientific knowledge constantly expands as causal
chains connect previously unexplained phenomena. 56 Third, deductive reasoning takes precedence over inductive reasoning. The
primary method of causal explanation, and thus of knowledge, was
57
thought to be deductive reasoning.
Hempel was criticized for failing to explain the increasing role
of statistical evidence in science. 58 Ultimately, Hempel acknowledged that inductive-statistical evidence could be used in scientific
explanation, but he doubted that such evidence could provide the
basis for causal reasoning and thus afforded such evidence a subsidiary status. 59 This position proved untenable. Indeed, develop54
Hempel has argued that scientific theories are deductive-nomological explanations. A deductive-nomological explanation effects a deductive subsumption of the explanation under principles that have characteristics of a general law. Id. at 337.
55
Thus scientific knowledge is logical and mathematical, but cloaked or expressed
in causal language. Developments in geometry in the late 19th century reinforced this
view of scientific information. See generally M. HESSE, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE (1974); D. SHAPERE, PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF NATURAL SCIENCE (1965).
56
It is the sense of ever expanding and improving scientific knowledge that is posi-

tivism's influence in corpuscularianism. See Brennan & Carter, Legal and Scientific
Probability of Causation of Cancer and OtherEnvironmental Diseasein Individuals, 10J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & LAW 33, 37 (1985).
57 See C. HEMPEL, supra note 53, at 369.
58 Hempel's rendition of positivistic corpuscularianism was criticized because it
failed to account for some important explanations. Foremost among these explanations
were statistical analyses that are adequate for prediction, but not underpinned by a
corpuscularian logical structure. I. SCHEFFLER, THE ANATOMY OF INQUIRY 42 (1963).
Such statistical analyses and inductive reasoning could not be explained by a theory of
science based on deductive, ever-expanding corpuscularian covering laws and a notion
that uncertainty was simply a phenomenon awaiting deductive enrollment under a coveing law. See Scriven, Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory, 130 SCIENCE 477
(1959).
59 As a result, Hempel acknowledged that in addition to deductive nomological reasoning, there existed inductive-statistical explanations. Hempel accorded subsidiary status to inductive-statistical explanations because he thought they were relative to certain
knowledge situations and thus not universal like deductive nomological statements.
Moreover, Hempel doubted that inductive-statistical statements could be accepted as a
basis for causal propositions. Thus Hempel's mature positivism featured deductive reasoning from covering law to phenomena, with causal propositions as the commonsense
stand-in for these deductive statements. In addition, as covering laws grew, uncertainty
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ments in physics called into question the entire structure of
positivism-corpuscularianism. At the end of the nineteenth century,
the mechanistic physics and mathematics of Newton, upon which
corpuscularian notions were so dependent, were undermined by
field theories supported by integro-differential equations and matrix
analysis. 60 This process continued in the twentieth century with the
61
development of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity.
Philosophers of science simply could not ignore the expanding role
of inductive reasoning and statistical evidence in physics.6 2 These
developments in physics paralleled others in medicine, with epidemiologists William Farr and John Snow, among others, pioneering
63
the use of probabilistic evidence.
In the past twenty years philosophers have come to appreciate
the importance of theory and hypothesis building in the enterprise
of science. The philosophy of science now recognizes that scientists
consciously use hypothesis testing to confront uncertainty, often using probabilistic evidence and inductive reasoning. Moreover, scientific progress is not understood as the relentless accumulation of
phenomena under covering laws, but as a succession of theories or
"problem shifts." 64 Scientists use theories to formulate hypotheses.
was overcome. Statistical analysis fit only tenuously into this framework. See C. HEMPEL,
supra note 53, at 177. See also R. VON MISES, POSITIVISM: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 188 (1951).
60

See M. BUNGE, supra note 47, at 75.

61 See D. BOHM, supra note 50, at 131. Modern physics thus lost much of the commonsense appeal that had made the corpuscularian analysis of causation so appealing.
Uncertainty became a concept more meaningful than something simply outside the covering laws, especially as probability theory was incorporated into physics. Thus, as Suppes noted, "[B]y the late 1960s a general consensus had been reached among
philosophers of science that the Received View [positivism] was inadequate as an analysis of scientific theories." F. SUPPES, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 4 (2d ed.
1977).
62 Much of the criticism of Hempel and corpuscularianism/positivism was directed
at the role of the all important correspondence rules that related theory to fatt. See
Schaffner, CorrespondenceRules, 36 PHIL. Sci. 280 (1969); see also Suppes, What is a Scientific
Theory, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE TODAY 55 (S. Morgenbesser ed. 1967) (examining
variety of concepts that define "scientific theory").
63 See generally M. SUSSER, CAUSAL THINKING IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES: CONCEPTS
AND STRATEGIES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 22-23 (1973).
64 In order to better understand science and the causal principles science produces,
philosophers have returned to the epistemological issues Kant raised in answer to
Hume. In addition, philosophers have paid closer attention to the manner in which
scientists actually address uncertainty. The result is the so-called hermeneutic analysis
of science. Hermeneutics is defined as the study of methodological principles of interpretation. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1059 (1976). A hermeneutic approach allows a philosopher to understand the interplay of theory and
phenomenal evidence, and leads to a renewed emphasis on the manner in which hypotheses guide scientists. In effect, Kant's noumenal aspects of reality are openly recognized. See T. WILKERSON, supra note 50, at 185. Lakatos, for instance, argues that
scientific progress is a result of a succession of theories or a 'problem shift,' rather than a
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They test these hypotheses by designing experiments that will provide anticipated results defined by the hypotheses. The whole process relies heavily on inductive reasoning. More important,
scientists often based their reasoning on probabilistic evidence. 6 5
Science is not simply an extension of causal chain analysis or covering law deductions. As Hanson notes, "Causal chain analysis is generally unsatisfactory [in] that causal chain accounts are loaded with
assumptions and theoretical presuppositions: these are such that
without them the cause singled out would not be sufficient to produce the effect .... Causes are connected with events; but this is
because our theories connect them, not because the world is held
together by cosmic glue." 6 6 This also means that scientific progress
is not simply the expansion of covering laws; rather science develops as certain hypotheses provide better explanation when tested
67
and refinement improves theories.
This is not to say that causal language is not scientific language. 68 Scientists use causal concepts to set up hypotheses. The
method by which they test these hypotheses often involves using inductive reasoning and probabilistic evidence. Thus a scientific explanation is framed in terms of causality, but the evidence to
support that explanation need not involve a neat, deductively derived causal chain. Indeed more often than not, the evidence is
summarized by a probability statement in the form of a 'p' value. 69
simple matter of deductive enrollment of phenomena under covering laws. Lakatos,
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes in CRITICISM AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 118 (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970); see also P. FEYER-

65

(1971).
See infra notes 171-214 and accompanying text.

66

N. HANSON, PATrERNS OF DISCOVERY 64 (1958).

ABEND, AGAINST METHOD

67 As Kuhn has emphasized, a phenomena which was once well explained by a covering law, could be understood in a completely different way following a scientific
revolution. Thus it is theories that provide knowledge, not an uncovering of the essential deductive and logical nature of the universe, as the corpuscularian model held. Hermeneutic analysis supplies another critical insight of science concerning the growth of
scientific knowledge. Science is no longer portrayed as an ever expanding set of information, linked by covering laws' deductive reasoning. Instead, science is conceived of as
sets of competing theories that are analyzed in terms of their ability to explain observations. Scientific revolutions occur when a new theory supersedes others in terms of its
explanatory power. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1961).
Hermeneutic analysis of scientific reasoning is not positivistic in its posture. There is no

faith in science's ultimate ability to explain and solve all problems simply by expanding
deductive reasoning and causal chain analysis. Rather, new theories are formulated and
hypotheses tested-explanations are cast in terms of the best explanation, not as ultimate explanations.
68 To the contrary, discussions of highly probabilistic fields such as quantum
mechanics are still framed in terms of causation. P. SUPPES, A PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF
CAUSALITY 5 (1970).
69 See infra notes 194-97. A hermeneutic analysis of science accepts that causal language describes scientific understanding, but recognizes that language is as often based
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In summary, scientists understand that theories define uncertainty and provide the basis for hypothesis building. The process of
hypothesis building and testing depends largely on inductive reasoning. Scientists often use probabilistic evidence to test hypotheses. As a result, statistical evidence deserves the same status as any
other type of evidence. Moreover, one cannot expect science to
provide deductive causal chains as the basis for all knowledge.
Scientists recognize that the causal concepts they use often express
70
probabilistic reasoning as deductive reasoning.
B.

Notions of Causation in the Law
1. Causationand the Jurisprudenceof Torts

An empiricist posture toward causation has dominated AngloAmerican jurisprudence of torts. 7 1 Although negligence does not
result in liability unless it causes injury or damage, legal scholars
have recognized that identification of a cause is seldom straightforward. As Fleming James and Roger Perry noted:
Obviously the legal test includes a requirement that the wrongful
conduct must be a cause in fact of the harm; but if this stood alone
the scope of liability would be vast indeed, for "the causes of
[causes] are infinite"-"the fatal trespass done by Eve was cause
on probabilistic statements as it is on deductive ones. Hermeneutic analyses, unlike positivistic corpuscularian models of science, are not crippled by methodological opposition
to inductive or probabilistic reasoning. Because the role of theory in defining uncertainty is fundamental to hermeneutic analysis, the inductive framing of a hypothesis and
its rejection or acceptance following statistical analysis is readily accepted and indeed
offers a better paradigm of scientific reasoning than does causal chain analysis. See
Bohm, A Suggested Interpretationof the Quantum Theory in Terms of "Hidden" Variables, 85
PHYSICAL REV. 166, 166 (1952) ("Quantum-mechanical probabilities are [under the proposed quantum theory] only a practical necessity and not ...a manifestation of an
inherent lack of complete determination in the properties of matter at the quantum
level.").
70 Causal language remains the vehicle for explaining physical phenomena while
hermeneutic analysis recognizes the role of theories and the importance of context. In
addition, probabilistic evidence is not subsidiary; indeed, testing and rejection of hypotheses based on statistical analysis is integral to science and offers a more realistic
paradigm of scientific thought than does pure deduction. See M. SUSSER, supra note 63,
at 69. The positivistic faith that science will soon explain the unknown has no place in a
philosophy of science that focuses on how scientists actually work. Although causal language remains dominant in scientific explanation, probabilistic reasoning provides the
basis for many of the theories that direct scientific inquiry and that lead to causal attribution. Theories and the explanations they offer are evaluated in terms of their cogency
and efficiency, but are not expected to eliminate all uncertainty. It follows that science is
not an unceasing march to total knowledge, but represents a competition of theories,
with both deductive and probabilistic reasoning used to judge the competitors. The
metaphor of science as a causal chain that is unceasingly elongated does not work. See
Brennan & Carter, supra note 56, at 46-47.
71
Hume's skepticism regarding perception of a causal power is the epitome of empiricism. H. HART &J. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 10-28 (1985).
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of all our woe." '7 2

The concept of proximate cause evolved to deal with the multiplicity of causes of events, as well as the contextual aspects of the
event itself. Legal policies allow a jurist to discriminate between
many so-called causes-in-fact and to identify a proximate cause for
the purpose of determining liability. Borgo has called this the
traditional legal doctrine of causation. 73 A long line of legal realists
have supported it, starting with Professor Green.7 4 As Borgo notes,
the theory of proximate cause is inconsistent with the use of causality in ordinary language, where it is presumed that each event has an
identifiable, individual antecedent cause. 7 5
Jurists' confrontation with difficult cases can explain the law's
willingness to abandon the ordinary meaning of causation in favor
of proximate cause. Innocuous events producing unexpected results can be used in a casual chain analysis in such a way that liability
falls in an unjust manner. Indeed, the tragic-comedy of a causal
chain of events recounted in a case like Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad76 provides the highlight of first year tort classes. The lack of an
easily identifiable "cause in fact" in such cases forces a court to incorporate policy issues into causal attribution; hence, the evolution
77
of proximate cause.
James & Perry, supra note 10, at 761.
See Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 421-22 (1979).
Borgo identifies three distinct doctrines of causation in tort law: (1) the traditional theory of legal realists that identifies many causes in fact, but allows policy to indicate a
proximate cause; (2) the Coasean model that requires interaction of two players; (3)
Calabresi's functional analysis of causation. Id. at 421-25.
74 See L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); see also Morris, On the
Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1939).
75
Borgo, supra note 73, at 421. Borgo argues that the "legal orthodoxy" holds that
harms are not necessarily the result of individual antecedent events. Id. Of course, this
implies that judges think about causation in a different way than ordinary individuals do.
I believe this is true insofar as decisions involving proximate cause reflect policymaking.
However, I would argue that judges revert to an emphasis on individual cases and antecedent events when presented with probabilistic evidence. See infra notes 149-70 and
accompanying text.
76
248 N.Y. 339, 168 N.E. 99 (1928).
77
An epistemological analysis of causation does not clarify whether the legal realists' advocacy of proximate cause derived from the concepts of causation that superseded Humean skepticism. See supra note 46. The theories presented by Hume and
Kant are not part of the legal realists criticism of cause in fact. Rather, the trouble with
cause in fact seems to be in identifying where the causal chain should end, not that
corpuscularian causal chain reasoning is flawed. The impetus for notions of proximate
cause was not that science had revealed that causal chain analysis was not sophisticated
enough, but that the causal chains themselves were too long and did not reliably indicate
liability. Thus, the legal realists rejected cause in fact in favor of proximate cause, but
this did not represent a hermeneutic understanding of science and causation. Deductively devised chains still dominate comtemporary analyses of causation, and legal orthodoxy depends on causal chain analysis.
72
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The past ten to fifteen years have witnessed a great deal of ferment in tort law, especially regarding causation. Legal scholars have
begun to explore the validity of causes founded on probabilistic evidence rather than deductive reasoning. Hart and Honor& have
stated:
It is easy here to be misled by the natural metaphor of a causal
'chain', which may lead us to think that the causal process consists
of a series of single events each of which is dependent upon
(would not have occurred without) its predecessor in the 'chain'
and so is dependent upon the initiating action or event. In truth
in any causal process we have at each phase not single events but
complex sets of conditions, and among these conditions are some
which are not only subsequent to, but independent of the initiat78
ing action or event.
Unlike James and Perry's complaint about the length of causal
chains, Hart and Honor6's statement evinces a recognition that causation is not simply a matter of identifying causal links.
Calabresi has argued that in addition to cause in fact and proximate cause, the law uses a third notion of causation. Calabresi calls
this "causal linkage" and characterizes it as follows: "[A] causal link
[exists] between an act or activity and an injury when we conclude
on the basis of the available evidence that the recurrence of that act
'79
or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur."
He contrasts this with the more familiar 'but for' and 'sine qua non'
cause, the ordinary-language use of cause in which a causal chain
points to a particular event as the cause.8 0 Calabresi does not elaborate on the differences between these concepts in the abstract, but
does note that they function differently when analyzed in terms of
the functions of the tort system.8 '
& T. HONORfE, supra note 71, at 72.
Calabresi, Concerning Causeand the Law of Torts: An Essayfor HarryKalven, Jr., 43 U.
Cut. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975).
80
Id. at 72.
81
Id Some other contributions to causal concepts in the law are worth mentioning. Shavell has built on Calabresi's distinctions between concepts of cause. See Shavell,
An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463
(1980). He calls the "but for" cause a "cause in fact," and characterizes it in terms of
the consequences being different if the cause in fact had not occurred. Id. at 467 n.14.
Cause in fact corresponds to the use of causation in everyday language. Shavell defines
causal linkage in much the same way as Calabresi did, and calls it probabilistic cause.
However, Shavell explains that probabilistic cause follows the adequate cause theory of
Von Kries and other European legal scholars. Id. at 468-69.
The adequate cause theory was developed by the German physiologist Von Kries in
the late 19th century. Von Kries was interested in probability theory and sociology. He
defined a harm's "adequate cause" as a contingency which satisfies two conditions: (1) it
is a sine qua non cause of the harm; and (2) it significantly increased the objective
probability of the harm. The latter condition was the focus of much attention by German legal scholars. H. HART & T. HONORI., supra note 71, at 467-78 (citingJ. VON KRIES,
78

79

H. HART
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Before turning to that functional analysis, it is interesting to
note that the distinctions between but for cause and probabilistic
causation coincide neatly with those between Newtonian physics and
modem science noted earlier.8 2 But for causation theory assumes
the existence of causal chain analysis, depends on a mechanistic understanding of causation, and coincides with everyday, common
sense notions of causation. The corpuscularian thinker can deductively derive a cause in fact. The only problem with but for causation concerns the reach of the deductive reasoning: selecting from
the causal chain the but for cause upon which liability falls can be
difficult. In contrast, probabilistic causation relies on probabilistic
reasoning, and is independent of a mechanistic understanding of
causation. Furthermore, probabilistic reasoning does not coincide
with conventional notions of causation. 8 3 Thus, but for cause or
cause in fact is the concept of causation that is employed in corpuscularian science, while probabilistic cause is integral to scientific
research.
Having uncovered similar tensions between but for and probabilistic cause in law and corpuscularian and more modem analysis in
science, I return to Calabresi's critical discussion of the function of
causal concepts in tort law. Calabresi recognizes two major goals of
tort law: compensation and deterrence.8 4 Each of these further divides into components.
Compensation goals include spreading the burden of injury
costs and imposing costs on those with "deep pockets." 8 5 These
goals ensure that the burden does not fall on those who cannot bear
it. Calabresi argues that proximate causation better achieves compensation goals from a functional point of view than does but for or
86
causal linkage.
UBEg DIE BEGRIFFE DER WAHRSCHEINLICHKEIT UND M6GLICHKEIT UND IHRE BEDEUNTUNG
IM STRAFRECHTE (1889). In particular, Traeger championed adequate cause theory, emphasizing the role of probability. His work, H. TRAEGER, DER KAUSALBEGRIFF IM STRAF-

UND ZIVILRECHT (1904), is the most frequently cited work on causation in German civil
courts. H. HART & T. HONOR9 supra note 71, at 4 7 1 n.29. Hart and HonorE note that the
development of statistical laws in science supported an adequate cause theory, especially
in quantum theory. Indeed, they allow that "some have maintained that it has now
ceased to be even a theoretical ideal of science to discover causal laws in the sense of
statements of conditions which are invariably followed by a given event without exception." Id. at 472.
82 See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
83 They are, however, dependent on context and circumstances, as Traeger emphasized. H. HART &J. HONOR9, supra note 71, at 476. Hermeneutic analysis rejected deductive, isolated causal chains in favor of context laden observation and inductive
reasoning. See supra notes 64-68.
84 Calabresi, supra note 79, at 73-91.
85

Id. at 73-77.

86 Calabresi argues that courts can use proximate cause to select that party best
able to spread the losses resulting from an injury. Id. at 74. Moreover, once a court has
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Deterrence is a different story. Calabresi distinguishes market
deterrence from collective deterrence.8 7 Both types of deterrence
attempt to balance injury and safety costs by avoiding those injuries
harmful enough to justify avoidance. Collective deterrence accomplishes this goal through political, collective compromises of safety
and injury costs. 8 Calabresi posits that causal linkage notions best
accomplish collective deterrence. By contrast, market deterrence
leaves those compromises to individual, atomistic market decisions.8 9 Market deterrence utilizes but for causation, as it readily
allows calculation of costs the cheapest cost avoider would incur. 90
Calabresi does not argue that market deterrence requires but for
cause; rather, he notes only that market deterrence goals explain the
primacy of but for causal notions in law. 91 Tort law attempts to deter costly injuries, and in a market economy, but for causal analysis
most readily accomplishes this goal.
Calabresi's analysis seems paradoxical at this point. He allows
that market deterrence "alone... can explain the virtual universality of the butfor test." 9 2 Moreover, he notes that the but for requirement is often described as an
"essential, almost categorical
imperative."9 3 Yet, Calabresi's functional analysis of torts relegates
but for causation to a rather minor status. Thus it seems that Calaestablished but for causation, it can also select proximate cause with regard to the deepest pocket. Id. at 76. Thus, proximate cause serves the functional goals of an efficient
tort system.
87 Id at 91-93, 101.
88 Id. at 78-84.
89 Id. at 84. Calabresi notes that the pure form of collective deterrence is a societal
judgment that certain acts are intolerable. Id. at 78. Calabresi argues that the Wagon
Mound case, Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., [1961] App. Cas.
388 (N.S.W.), represents an example of collective deterrence in that the case focuses on
the proscribed activities from a societal point of view, rather than the the individuals
actors' activities. Calabresi, supra note 79, at 80. Market deterrence emphasizes the individual's actions, because it depends on case-by-case determinations of action and intent.
Thus Calabresi distinguishes two conceptions of tort law: one centers on collective determination of proscribed activity; the other focuses on the actions of the individual. Id.
at 84.
90 Calabresi thus creates an attractive symmetry. Causal linkage notions require
analysis at the level of the group's desires and actions. Collective deterrence shares this
analytic framework while market deterrence proceeds at the individual level. "By using
the but for requirement, we tell the chosen loss bearer that its burden will equal those
costs that, butfor its behavior, would not have been incurred .... Calabresi, supra note
79, at 85-86.
91

Id. at 87.

Id. at 85.
93
Id. Calabresi's choice of words highlights the difference between his synthesis of
causal notions and that of Richard Epstein. For Epstein, causation has moral forcemoral force that is self-evident. E.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD.
151 (1973) [hereinafter Epstein, Strict Liability]; Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, Causationand CorrectiveJustice:A Reply to Two Critics, 8J. LEGAL
STUD. 477 (1979). Kant based his moral theory on just this sort of categorical impera92
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bresi acknowledges a dominant role for but for causation in legal
reasoning, but accords it only a very subsidiary status in his functional analysis of tort law.
Perhaps one can explain this paradox by noting that Calabresi
did not address the role of but for causation as a vehicle for considerations of corrective justice. In contrast with economic analyses of
tort law, such as that suggested by Calabresi, some legal scholars
have posited that tort law has a normative role, and should reflect
the notions of individual morality contained within ordinary language. Foremost among these scholars is Richard Epstein, and a
brief review of his work demonstrates what Calabresi's economic
analyses of tort law lacks.
Epstein's central thesis is that ordinary language reflects certain
moral ideals, 9 4 one of which is that people are responsible for the
harm they cause. 95 It follows from this that liability in tort law
should be based on causation, not on policies that determine the
proximate cause. Epstein's approach leads naturally to certain corollaries, including a preference for strict liability and a refusal to ac96
cept positive duties.
Several important points emerge from the mere existence of
the debate between Calabresi and Epstein. First, Epstein's corrective justice model of causation is firmly grounded in the notions of
political morality that guide the liberal state. 97 The state grants individuals the widest possible sphere of negative freedom, 98 and
holds them responsible when their actions encroach on the negative
freedom of others. Tort law based on corrective justice does not
serve these goals, and within that framework, causation focuses on
the individual. 9 9
Second, Calabresi's functional approach accommodates probative. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 61 (H. Paton trans.
1947) (2d ed. 1798).
94 Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
165, 166 (1974).
95 Posner summarizes Epstein's major tenets in a succinct, yet accurate, manner.
Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 458-59 (1979).
96 A rigorous critique of the various tort law formulations proposed by Calabresi
and Epstein is beyond the scope of this Article.
97 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
98 Id. See McPherson, Maximization of Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 83 (P. Laslett & W. Runcimann eds. 1967). Nonetheless, the notion of liberty as
negative freedom guarded by rights has provided the basis for much of American political theory in the last 15 years. See R. Nozicx, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
99 Epstein uses the rubric of the original position, or the pristine, fundamental society, as an analytic tool. See Epstein, supra note 94, at 198. The same sort of analysis is
the cornerstone of Rawls's thoroughgoing description of the liberal state. J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See also Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, in READING
RAWLS 230 (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
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bilistic notions of causation, but does not incorporate corrective justice.10 0 Probabilistic causation depends on concepts of likelihood
and grouli activities or behavior,' 0 ' whereas corrective justice concepts of causation rely on analysis of individual behavior. Assigning
liability within Epstein's model requires a dearly drawn causal chain
linking an individual with a particular harm. 0 2 Any system of tort
law that relies predominately on corrective justice as a basis for
causal assignment will probably fail to accommodate probabilistic
03
causal concepts.'
In summary, legal notions of causation reflect a complex inter100 Calabresi does not claim that his discussion of tort law is exhaustive. He does
not, however, explicitly entertain concepts of morality within tort law. See Calabresi,
supra note 79.
Rosenberg argues that corrective justice can be accommodated by probabilistic
forms of causation. His perception of corrective justice is that "wrongdoers should
make their victims whole." See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 877. He would argue, therefore, that corrective justice is served by having manufacturers of hazardous substances
compensate groups of victims according to the proportion of disease caused. Corrective
justice, as Epstein uses the term, and as it is used in the liberal tradition, involves a
"causal chain" type of causation, not probabilistic causation.
The link between injurer and injured is critical, and is not a probable link. This
insight is the key to understanding the problem courts have with hazardous-substance
litigation. Moral causation, which produces corrective justice, assumes mechanistic notions of causation. Rosenberg's belief that corrective justice can rely on probabilistic
causation can be supported only when there is little uncertainty in the probabilistic attribution, as in the asbestos litigation. Most hazardous-substance cases involve much more
uncertainty, and present a greater challenge to corrective justice theory. See infra notes
216-55 and accompanying text.
101 See Calabresi, supra note 79, at 71.
102
Indeed Borgo criticizes Epstein for relying on the covering law model as proposed by Hempel. See Borgo, supra note 73, at 434-45.
103 This may be especially true in criminal law. Devlin has compared criminal law to
a citadel at the heart of the legal system, surrounded by the battlements of civil law. P.
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1-25 (1965). Thus, criminal law may have a
larger element of corrective justice and moral impact. Causation that relies on overtly
probabilistic reasoning is especially suspect in the criminal setting. See Tribe, Tial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1971) (rejecting statistical evidence in criminal law). But see Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the
Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 34 (1979) (arguing that probability theories could be
used effectively and opponents should have burden of disproving theories' utility).
The problems raised by identification cases such as People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d
319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968), have crystallized in litigation over
parenthood. See Tribe, supra, at 1334-38 (discussing Collins case). The scientific technique of HLA typing allows one to exclude up to 90% of falsely identified men in paternity cases. It is, however, based on statistical techniques and courts have only slowly
accepted it. See Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979);
Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 NJ. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979); see also Black & Lilienfeld,
Epidemiologic Proofin Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984) (asserting that
toxic tort plaintiffs must prove by introducing statistical evidence that it is "more likely
than not" that accused substance caused harm).
As an aside, Posner expressed Epstein's view in DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d
203, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,J., dissenting), a case in which Posner embraces probabilistic evidence.
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play of several concepts. But for causation or cause in fact, which
reflects commonly held assumptions about causation as well as certain moral and political notions of responsibility, tends to dominate
the disposition of tort claims. Moreover, this rendition of but for
causation coincides neatly with that of corpuscularian science. Probabilistic linkage10 4 is distinguished from but for cause, but has a
nebulous role in Anglo-American legal reasoning. Probabilistic
causal notions correspond to the causal notions that modern science
employs in that they are based on probabilistic evidence rather than
simple deductively derived causal chains. Legal scholars generally
have not assumed the existence of a singular causal power, nor have
they used probabilistic notions in analyses of causation, but rather
have relied on the policy-laden concept of proximate cause to identify the bearer of liability. 10 5
From this discussion of competing notions of causation in law
and science emerges a hypothesis that explains why courts have so
much trouble with causation issues in toxic tort litigation. The scientific association between a toxic substance and injury to a person
relies on probabilistic evidence: epidemiological studies and statistical associations.' 0 6 Philosophers of science readily accept such evidence and, indeed, acknowledge that probabilistic reasoning
dominates much of physics and medicine.' 0 7 In corpuscularian writing, probabilistic evidence is second best, if acceptable at all, and
corpuscularian notions of causation coincide with but for concepts
of causation in tort law. Both rely heavily on causal chain analyses
and individual actions. Corrective justice aspects of tort law assume
the existence of traceable causal chains leading from actor to harm.
As a result, tort law tends to induce a corpuscularian approach to
scientific evidence. Litigants bringing scientific issues to court are
expected to show causes in fact or but for causes, with minimal support from the policies of proximate cause.
A corpuscularian judge would not want to deal with probabilistic notions, as he would regard these as inferior methods of reason104
I use the term probabilistic linkage for Calabresi's causal linkage because I think
it better expresses the nature of the concept.
105
It is not surprising that neither the notion of causal linkage nor Epstein's corrective justice are part of what Borgo calls the legal orthodoxy. See Borgo, supra note 73, at
425. The analysis I have offered, however, is skewed towards that of Borgo. Epstein's
analysis of causation relies on strict causal chains supported by morality. Borgo's legal
orthodoxy also heavily relies upon causal chain analysis. Causal linkage, on the other
hand, embraces probabilistic notions of causation. Judges are guided by proximate causation, but moral concepts discussed by Epstein play a role in judges' thinking. Any

incorporation of Epstein's concept of morality into legal reasoning leads to causal chain
analysis playing a more central role.
106) See ifra notes 171-214 and accompanying text.
107
See D. BoJiM, supra note 50; P. Supp-s, supra note 68.
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ing. Rather than accept probabilistic statements, a corpuscularian
judge would delay a decision until deductive, mechanistic, but for
causes are available. Nor would a corpuscularian judge welcome uncertainty in a scientific issue-uncertainty will be overcome according to positivism, and it is best to wait until this occurs. In addition,
tort law's corrective justice aspects would not permit uncertainty in
08
the causal assignment of responsibility.1
In this regard, common law courts are neither unscientific nor
ignorant. Rather, they cling to conceptions of individual responsibility that coincide neatly with eighteenth century science's notions
of causation. Thus, it is not enough simply to say that courts should
adopt probabilistic reasoning. They must be instructed. But given
the importance of the moral concept of individual responsibility in
tort law, we can expect courts to accommodate only so much probabilistic reasoning.
Unfortunately, toxic substance injury cases cannot produce
mechanistic, deductively-derived causal evidence, and a corpuscularian judge cannot process the available probabilistic evidence.
Thus, the causation problem in toxic tort litigation could result
from an epistemological quandary. Judges, using but for causation
when analyzing tort claims, may slip into corpuscularian reasoning
about scientific evidence, even when that evidence is primarily
probabilistic. 109
2.

Case Law

The explanation of the causation problem in hazardous-substance litigation outlined above remains only a hypothesis, which is
proved only if the case law indicates that judges avoid probabilistic
evidence and demand but for causes. Judges could avoid probabilistic evidence in two ways. First, they could simply refuse to accept
such evidence. Second, they could focus only on the aspects of the
probabilistic evidence that resemble a causal chain, while ignoring
the scientifically more important probabilistic evidence. 110
The initial cases indicating corpuscularian attitudes toward sci108

Even less uncertainty is permitted in criminal law. See Tribe, supra note 103, at

1372.
109 I do not mean to say that judges necessarily reach the wrong conclusion. Per-

haps they are using a notion of causation akin to that outlined by Epstein. See Esptein,
Strict Liability, supra note 93.
110 Although relatively few judicial decisions regarding injuries from toxic sub-

stances exist (probably because many cases are resolved without published opinions)
more are becoming available. See Brennan & Carter, supra note 56, at 53-55. Statistical
evidence provides the basis for claims in other areas of civil litigation. Black and
Lilienfeld have exhaustively catalogued these. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 103, at
770-73.
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ence and disease were the so-called traumatic cancer cases.
Although science has not identified traumatic accidents as a cause of
cancer, judges have relied on evidence of traumatic blows or dermal
irritations when deciding issues of cancer causation. 1 1 ' This attitude evinces corpuscularianism: a mechanistic sense of causation allows a judge to identify a "but for" cause when the available
scientific evidence is probabilistic in nature.
When a traumatic event was not available to provide a simple
causal chain from exposure to injury, courts usually have chosen to
ignore 12 or to sidestep causation issues. 113 Other courts have refused outright to consider any epidemiological evidence,1 4 particularly evidence of low-level exposure integral to epidemiology." 15
Many of those courts that have taken into account probabilistic evi116
dence have not used it to find causation.
Some courts have discussed the relation of probabilistic evidence to legal causal evidence. For instance, the court in Crim v.
International Harvester Co. 117 noted that "medical testimony that a

particular type of work statistically increases the probability of getting valley fever does not constitute evidence of a causal connection
between the disease and the employment, even when the doctor
uses the magic phrase 'reasonable medical certainty.' "118 In other
words, statistical evidence cannot prove causation. Miller v. National
Cabinet Co. 119 provides another example of corpuscularian judicial
reasoning. In Miller, a wrongful death action was brought on behalf
of a worker exposed to benzol who died of leukemia. The court
noted that "[tlhe only possible basis for drawing an inference in

III See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 103, at 741; Comment,JudidalAttitudes Towards
Legal and Scientific Proofof Cancer Causation, 3 COLUM. J. EmvrL. L. 344, 349-54 (1977).
112 See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)
(suit against tobacco company for lung cancer injuries).
113
State Compensation Fund v.Joe, 25 Ariz. App. 361, 543 P.2d 790 (1975).
114 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gourley, 267 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1959) (court ruled that
probabilistic information did not bear on heart attack susceptibility issue).
115 See Clark v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 726, 753, 187
S.E.2d 213, 277 (1972) (court ignored expert testimony about possibility of chronic as
well as acute exposures to toxic chemicals while deceased employed at chemical plant).
116 See, e.g., Lartigue v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963)
(court noted that jury never got past causation issue in lung cancer from smoking case);
see also Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823, 840 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (without
considering impact of new evidence, court refused to accept "10,000 to I" statistical
probability that Hodgkins disease resulted from radiation at Oak Ridge National Laboratories); Amorosco v. Tubular & Cast Prods. Mfg. Co., 13 N.Y.2d 992, 194 N.E.2d 694,
244 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1963) (mem.) (plumbing supplies manufacturer's employee denied
compensation, even though court accepted evidence of increased incidence of lung cancer among plumbers).
117
646 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1981).
118 Id. at 165.
119 8 N.Y.2d 277, 168 N.E.2d 811, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1960).
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favor of claimant ...would be statistics indicating that in many in0
stances leukemia follows benzol exposure without knowing why." 12
The court's inference is that one knows something only when a
mechanistic causal chain is identified, and statistical inferences do
not contribute to such knowledge. Courts want but for causes from
science-causes that bear directly on the individual. For example,
one court in discussing estimates of damages, stated, "Expectancy
or statistical data about a group do not establish concrete facts
about an individual. An attempt to make what is at best a sheer
guess more precise by introducing another uncertain factor is not
apt to improve the accuracy of a calculation ....,,121 Thus, courts
have been willing to reject probabilistic evidence, even when that
evidence exemplifies the hypothesis creation and observation that
now form the basis of scientific research. Courts do not expect discussion of uncertainty from science; they want causal chains that
lead to but for causes.
Over the past ten years, plaintiffs have brought a growing
number of suits that rely on probabilistic proof of causation, thereby
forcing courts to weigh such evidence more critically. Indeed, some
courts have begun to discuss probabilistic evidence in a knowledgeable and insightful manner.12 2 These decisions implicitly recognize
the heterogeneity of scientific evidence and investigation and implicitly support the use of probabilistic causation. Somejudges have
recognized that legal notions of causation may be out of step with
scientific ones. For instance, in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Service,
Inc., 123 the court made the following observation: "In doing so, he
was not the only witness who exhibited how differently engineers
and attorneys look at the concepts of fault. Technical witnesses,
dealing in uncertainties and statistical probabilities, seemed at times
to reflect a completely different view of responsibility from that
12 4
which attorneys are accustomed to."
Nonetheless, most courts have continued to insist on "but for"
Id. at 283, 168 N.E.2d at 814, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
Heckman v. The Federal Press Co., 587 F.2d 612, 617 (3d Cir. 1978); see also
Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 370, 431 P.2d 794, 796 (1967) ("While it
seems logical that the unusually high incidence of lung cancer in uranium miners would
indicate in the same ratio the higher probability than otherwise that such was the cause
of the disease, it nevertheless falls short of compelling a finding that such was the cause
in any individual case.").
122
See Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 586-87 (3d Cir. 1980) (court calls for better
statistical methodology in radition induced birth defects case); see also In re High, 638
P.2d 818 (Colo.Ct. App. 1981) (court reversed lower court's decision to deny benefits
to uranium mine inspector with lung cancer because he smoked a pipe); McCormick v.
United Nuclear Corp., 89 N.M. 740, 557 P.2d 589 (1976) (recovery allowed for lung
cancer suffered by uranium miner).
123 467 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. La. 1978).
124
Id. at 1287 n.12.
120
121
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or "sufficient" causes and have refused to accept the probabilistic
evidence upon which physicians and scientists have long relied in
understanding disease and treating patients. The court in Union
Carbide v. Industrial Commission,' 2 5 for example, stated that
there has been some dispute over the 'sufficient to cause' wording
of the Smith test. The problem is that the legal definition is at
variance with the medical definition. The medical experts do not
speak of concentrations which are 'sufficient to cause' occupaconcentrations which 'increase
tional diseases, but rather refer to126
the risk' of contracting a disease.
In the past three years, the trickle of hazardous-substance injury
suits has become a flood. Increasingly, these cases have required
courts to examine statistical and epidemiological evidence of causation. A few courts have come to terms with the epidemiological evidence presented by plaintiffs and defendants.1 27 Unfortunately,
even when courts are willing to review such evidence, they show a
tendency to fall back into a corpuscularian state of mind when the
probabilistic evidence is confusing. When the epidemiological studies are in conflict, or when they have deficiencies in their design,
courts are placing more weight on the "treating" physician's decision about the cause of the disease in the individual patient, regard196 Colo. 56, 581 P.2d 734 (1978).
Id at 61 n.6, 581 P.2d at 737 n.6.
InJohnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), for
example, the Kansas Supreme Court closely examined the evidence of the risk presented
by Sabin oral polio vaccine. Johnson was stricken with polio after his daughter was vaccinated. The vaccine manufacturer was aware of the minuscule risk that this could occur
and warned the administering physician of this risk in the vaccine package insert.
Notwithstanding the warning, a jury awarded the plaintiff $10,000,000. On appeal, the
Kansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the epidemiological evidence for the risk of
polio to a vaccinated child's parent and overturned the jury verdict. This outcome
should be applauded by public health advocates, given that the risk of such occurrences
are far outweighed by the benefits of mass vaccination.
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
provides another example of a court carefully examining probabilistic evidence. In this
case the District of Columbia Court of Appeals overturned a trial court's decision to
grant the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. for a child who allegedly was harmed
in utero by the anti-emetic drug, bendectin. The court demonstrated considerable understanding of toxicological evidence by reviewing the four principal grounds for identifying toxicity: structure-activity information; in vivo, or animal bioassay studies; in vitro
or short term screening assays; and epidemiology. Id. at 1104-08. The court also analyzed in detail the expert witnesses' discussions of the epidemiological studies that provided the most important evidence for bendectin's teratogenic properties. Id. The
opinion contains a long review of relative-risk calculations and the role of confidence
intervals in decisions about statistical significance. Id. at 1108-09. This decision demonstrates that courts are slowly beginning to abandon insistence on "but for" causes, and
are showing more willingness to review epidemiological evidence.
Other courts have analyzed epidemiological evidence and found some heterogeneity in the assumptions that underlie the epidemiological studies in question-a critical
insight. See O'Gara v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
125
126
127
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less of whether the physician based that decision on an
understanding of all the available evidence or on merely anecdotal
information.
The litigation concerning victims of Guillain-Barre syndrome
(GBS) following swine flu vaccination provides a good example of
this tendency. In most of these federal district court cases, the
judges relied on one epidemiological study by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) that revealed a peak increased risk for GBS in
128
the second and third weeks following the vaccination.
Claims based on episodes of GBS that occurred after the sixweek period following vaccination were denied. In several cases,
however, the plaintiff presented a different epidemiological study
that had found an increased risk for GBS beyond the six-week cutoff
advocated by the U.S. Attorney. In Gaul v. United States 129 the court
reviewed the alternative study in detail and demonstrated a great
deal of sophistication in its analysis of attack rates and the assumptions underlying the conflicting studies. 3 0° The court rejected the
alternative study and the plaintiff's claim.13 ' Likewise, in Sulesky v.
United States, 132 a plaintiff suffering the onset of GBS after the sixweek cutoff relied on the alternative study and disputed the CDC
study. On this occasion the court, rather than delving into analysis
of the probabilistic evidence, instead relied on the treating physician's opinion regarding the relationship between the vaccine and
the disease. The court stated that "expert epidemiological testimony is not determinative of the issue of causation in this case....
Rather,... the Court finds that the resolution of the causation issue
33
turns on the testimony of the treating and evaluating physicians."'
Because the treating physician thought that the vaccine had caused
34
the GBS, the court found for the plaintiff.'
The Sulesky court never explained the special expertise that enabled this physician to determine the outcome of the case. Indeed,
the court leaves the impression that the treating physician can rely
128
Grubbs v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 536, 539 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (citing
"Schonberger study," Schonberger, Bregman, Sullivan & Bolyai, Guillain-BarreSyndrome
Following Vaccination in the National Influenza Immunization Program, United States, 19761977, 110 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 105 (1979)). See also Gaul v. United States, 582 F. Supp.
1122, 1127-30 (D. Del. 1984) (rejecting independent statistical evaluation of CDC data
that claimed risk was present for up to 16 weeks); Bean v. United States, 533 F. Supp.
567, 577 (D. Colo. 1980) (summarizing expert testimony regarding nexus between some
flu vaccine and Guillain-Barre Syndrome).
129
582 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Del. 1984).
130
Id. at 1127-31.
13'
Id. at 1130.
132
545 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. W.Va. 1982).
133
Id. at 430.
134 Id.
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on any sort of anecdotal evidence, even if his expertise comes only
from the fact that he treated the injured individual. Thus, the court
refused to analyze in detail the probabilistic evidence and turns to
the physician to provide a "but for" cause in this case. In a case like
Sulesky, the courts' tendency to defer to the treating physician's
opinion i3 5 demonstrates the corpuscularian distrust of epidemiological evidence.
This kind of outcome might be more frequent in the future as a
result of the decision of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 136 Ferebee concerned a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the family of an
agricultural worker at a government research center. 3 7 Mr.
Ferebee had died of pulmonary fibrosis, allegedly caused by long
term exposure of his skin to the chemical paraquat. 3 8 A jury
awarded the Ferebee family $60,000.13 9 Chevron Oil Company, the
manufacturer of paraquat, appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.
The court's opinion began by carefully reviewing scientific evidence presented at trial. It noted that two experts examined Ferebee, one of whom was identified as the chief of the pulmonary
branch of the National Institutes of Health's Heart, Lung and Blood
Institute. 40 Both experts testified that long-term dermal absorption of paraquat caused the deceased's pulmonary fibrosis. 14 1 Chevron countered that the side effects of paraquat were limited to acute
toxicities 142 and that the concept of dermal absorption leading to
pulmonary fibrosis represented a novel theory, wholly unsupported
143
by epidemiological studies.
The court insisted that the jury was entitled to decide the causation issue and could properly base its decision on the plaintiff's two
expert witnesses' testimony. It further stated that courts can decide
cases even when the expert opinion on which the court relies is not
generally accepted by the scientific community. In an extremely important passage, the court noted:
Thus, a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established
by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify
that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic
135
There is little doubt that courts have a tendency to defer to medical expertise
and especially to treating physicians. See Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale?: Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 137, 148 (1977).
136
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137
Id. at 1532.
138
Id. at 1533.
139
Id. at 1532.
140
Id. at 1533.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 1535.
143
Id.
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methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, such
as use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examination,
products liability law does not preclude recovery until a "statistically significant" number of people have been injured or until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated
laboratory studies of the chemical. In a courtroom, the test for
allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not scien144
tific certainty, but legal sufficiency ....
The court probably considered two issues in denying Chevron's
appeal: the testimony of an expert witness who was truly a leading
expert in the area of pulmonary pathology and the unfairness of penalizing the earliest victims of any hazardous substance.1 45 Nonetheless, the court's decision does suggest a certain corpuscularian
frame of mind, in that it downplays the probabilistic evidence that
toxicologists utilize, and re-affirms the importance of the examining
physician's conclusion. This kind of ruling enables other courts to
ignore probabilistic evidence and to rely solely on the testimony of a
treating physician, no matter how novel the causal chain upon which
that physician relies.
The Wells v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. 14 6 litigation demonstrates
the kind of difficulties that the reasoning used in Ferebee can produce. In Wells, the parents of a child born with multiple birth defects brought a products liability action on behalf of the child
against the manufacturer of a spermicide used by the child's mother
before and after conception. At both parties' request, the case was
tried without a jury. The court noted that the decision was difficult
primarily because of the conflicting scientific evidence presented by
the parties. 14 7 To illustrate the court's difficulty, it used over twenty
pages in the opinion to review the testimony of fourteen key expert
witnesses.1 4 8 This review convincingly details the court's proposition that leading authorities in the field can disagree about the association between spermicides and certain birth defects.
This Article does not address the details of this scientific controversy, but instead focuses on the generic issues that the court
raised. The first issue concerns the minimal weight that the court
placed on defendant's evidence that no statistical association exists
between the product and the injury. The court noted simply that
"[a]lthough the studies on which defendant relied failed to detect an
144
145

Id. at 1535-36.
These early victims, like Mr. Ferebee, would provide the data for studies upon

which later victims could rely.
146
615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107
S. Ct. 437 (1986).
147
Id. at 266.
148

Id. at 269-91.

498

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:469

association between spermicides and birth defects, some of defendants' [sic] own experts testified that these studies do not rule out all
possibility that spermicides can cause birth defects."' 4 9 This finding
could indicate that negative epidemiological studies will not sway a
court. Unfortunately, it could also indicate that the party attempting
to disprove an association between a product and an injury cannot
do so on the basis of epidemiological evidence.
The second generic issue is the court's reliance on testimony
concerning "mechanisms" or theories to demonstrate causation.' 5 0
Specifically, experts testified about an amniotic-band syndrome and
vascular-disruption hypotheses to explain the plaintiff's injury.' 5 '
This testimony influenced the court largely because it was based on
examination of the plaintiff. The court pointed out that it was concerned only with this plaintiff's injury. 152 Thus the court's opinion
asserts that when epidemiologic evidence shows no association between the product and the disease, but hypothesized" 'mechanisms'
of causation"' 153 appear to support an association, the defendant is
liable.
This interpretation of the Wells case shows how judges can be
corpuscularian even when they are willing to consider epidemiological evidence. As noted above, 154 scientists use theories to develop
hypotheses. They then test these hypotheses by experiments or by
designing statistical or epidemiological studies. If the studies are
sufficiently powerful, 155 and yet fail to show an association, then the
scientist rejects the hypothesis. The Wells court could be reversing
this line of reasoning. One can characterize the Wells court as embracing the hypothesis even though the epidemiological study failed
to show an association. The court focused on the individual and
relies on the mechanistic causal chain analysis evinced by the
hypothesis.
The defendant appealed the Wells decision to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the multimillion dollar verdict for the plain149
150

Id. at 292.

151
152

Id. at 292-93.
Id. at 292.

153

Id.

Id.

See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
155 See infra notes 210-14. See also Brennan, Untangling Causation Issues in Hazardous
Substance Litigation, 107 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 791 (1987). "Power" refers to the size of
a sample. An epidemiological study may fail to demonstrate an association, but there
are two possible reasons for such failure: (1) there is no association; and (2) the sample
size was not large enough to reject the null hypothesis. A powerful study is one with a
sample size that is calculated to be large enough to discriminate an association at a given
level.
154
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tiff.' 5 6 On appeal, Ortho Pharmaceutical argued that the trial court
had failed to consider adequately the epidemiological evidence of
no association. The Circuit Court rejected this argument, relying
squarely on Ferebee.157 The court reiterated that a difference exists
between legal and scientific causation. 158 Noting that it was most
interested in the injury suffered by the individual before it, the court
stated that "it does not matter in terms of deciding the case that the
medical community might require more research and evidence
before conclusively resolving the question."' 15 9 Thus the Ferebee distinction between legal and scientific causation appears to allow
courts to opt for the mechanistic causal chain reasoning that underlies a hypothesis even when experimental or epidemiological evi160
dence has not proved that hypothesis.
Such decisions create a great deal of uncertainty in the minds of
litigants regarding liability because they cannot predict which mode
of causation theory a court will use in evaluating conflicting evidence. One court might reject statistical data outright and choose a
causal chain anecdote proposed by an expert; another might review
the same evidence and accept a different anecdote. This kind of uncertainty over liability standards disrupts the future planning upon
16 1
which corporations and their insurers depend.
Common law courts' inability to incorporate probabilistic evidence into their legal analyses of responsibility and causation raises
fundamental questions regarding their ability to adjudicate hazardous-substance injury cases. According to Epstein's corrective justice
model of causation in torts, the court will seek mechanistic causal
chains linking individual events to individual injuries.1 62 The probabilistic evidence provided by toxicology and epidemiology cannot
produce such causal chains.' 63 Decisions like Ferebee and Wells suggest that the moral relationships between citizens in a liberal state
are part and parcel of tort jurisprudence. These moral concepts will
156
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 747 (lth Cir.) (affirming
plaintiff's verdict, but reducing $5.1 million award to $4.7 million), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
437 (1986).
157
158

Id. at 745.

159
160

Id

Id

The Ferebee distinction played an important role in the case of Hawkinson v. A.H.
Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D.Colo. 1984). In this case concerning injuries resulting from intra-uterine devices, the court intermixed preponderance of evidence issues
with scientific uncertainty notions thereby obscuring the causation issue entirely.
161
Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70
VA. L. REv. 965 (1984); see Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of
Successor CorporationLiability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984).
162

See the discussion of Epstein's corrective justice model of causation, supra notes

94-103 and accompanying text.
163 See infra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
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force judges and juries into a corpuscularian state of mind, thus
making satisfactory resolution of litigation involving probabilistic
evidence of causation impossible. 164
This is not to say that courts cannot understand statistical evidence. 16 5 In such diverse areas of the law as antitrust 16 6 and civil
rights, 167 courts use probabilistic evidence. Moreover, courts have
consistently found certain parties liable for hazardous-substance-induced injury on, the basis of probabilistic evidence. Indeed, the
"tort crisis" affecting industry and insurers has arisen from the massive liability that falls on asbestos companies and certain drug manufacturers. 168 Unfortunately, even these intensely litigated issues
have not produced adequate discussions of causation. When a rare
tumor is closely associated with a toxic substance, courts generally
take the causation issue as a given. This is the case in the asbestos
litigation 169 as well as in the diethylstilbestrol/vaginal adenocarci170
noma cases.
164
Impossible, that is unless one argues that the moral theory underlying tort law is
not liberal at all. Professor Robinson has developed an outline of this argument, based
on a discussion of Kantian moral theory. See Robinson, ProbabilisticCausationand Compensationfor Tortious Risk, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 789 (1985). Professor Weinrib's discussion
of Aristotlean morality and tort law is, I think, much more convincing, and implicitly
supports Epstein's focus on the individual and mechanistic causation. See Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 38-43 (1983).
165
See D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF (1983); W. CURTIS, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS
FOR ATrORNEYS (1983).
166
See D. BARNES, supra note 165, at 294-95.
167
See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482 (1977). These cases do not demonstrate that the court had any grasp of
probabilistic evidence. See Brennan & Carter, supra note 56, at 53-54.
In Hazelwood, International Bhd. of Teamsters, and Castaneda, all relatively early cases,
the Court merely had to note the difference in proportions of minority groups in the
population as opposed to that of the particular body at issue, such as the grand juries in
Castaneda. This required little probabilistic reasoning. In more recent cases, the courts
face more sophisticated analysis that includes regression analysis and multivariate techniques. The extent of the courts' ability to deal with this evidence is unclear, although
there is a recent example of excellent judicial comprehension of these issues. See McNeil
v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987). A recent Supreme Court ruling on death penalty issues does not reveal the same level of comprehension. McClesky
v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
168 See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 853. See generally S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF
CANCER (1979).
169 See infra text accompanying notes 215-31; see also Special Project, An Analysis of the
Legal, Social and PoliticalIssues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 607-25
(1983).
170
See Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 NEW ENGLAND J. MED.
878 (1971). Courts might be forced to review causation issues if there were evidence
that conflicted with the original studies that produced the linkage of asbestos to asbestosis and lung cancer, or DES to adenocarcinoma. See Horwitz, The Role of Susceptibility Bias
in EpidemiologicalResearch, 145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 909 (1985).
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Courts are troubled by the probabilistic evidence of causation
with regard to hazardous substance injury. In this section I have
outlined some theoretical explanations for these difficulties. Courts
rely on mechanistic notions of causation and are confused by probabilistic ones. This reliance on mechanistic causes reflects the notions of responsibility inherent in liberalism. Moreover, courts
assume that when mechanistic causes are not yet available, it is best
to procrastinate, as science is constantly producing new mechanistic
causes. As a result, courts are both corpuscularian and positivistic.
Having discussed the theoretical problems courts face when
considering probabilistic evidence, I now consider the nature of
such evidence and how its inherent probabilities and uncertainties
challenge the norms of tort law.
III
Toxic

SUBSTANCE INJURY:

EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION AND

THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY

A.

The Toxicology of Hazardous Substances

In the previous sections, I argued that courts are troubled by
the probabilistic evidence involved in the proof of hazardous-substance injury. The difficulty that judges and lawyers, as well as juries, have with statistical and epidemiological evidence arises from
the uncertainty involved in this kind of evidence, uncertainty that
conflicts with causal chain analysis paradigms. A scientist develops
hypotheses and then tests them by designing studies that indicate
the strength of the underlying reasoning. When that test involves
statistics, as it often does in biomedical science, the result is consciously hedged with uncertainty. Before courts can use probabilistic evidence to resolve legal problems raised by toxic substances,
courts must understand the nature of the uncertainty in toxicologi71
cal evidence.1
Toxicology is broadly defined as the science that deals with poisons and their effects. 172 In this Article, toxicology is restricted to
those poisons that I have broadly termed "hazardous substances."' 17 3 Hazardous substances are those occupational or environmental toxins or consumer products that are characterized by
five properties. First, people are exposed to them in a chronic and
171

I hope this discussion will also make clear the difficulties that arise in attempting

to estimate the size of the threat posed by hazardous substances. See supra notes 13-36
and accompanying text.
172 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2419 (1976).

173

See supra notes I 1-13. This is distinguished from toxicology of acute poisonings.

See CASSARE-TF & DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS (C. Klaassen, M.

Amdur &J. Doull 3d ed. 1986).
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relatively low-dose fashion. Second, exposed persons lack awareness of the toxic effect during the initial phase of the exposure.
Third, the exposure is followed by a latency period before the disease or injury manifests itself. Fourth, the injury or disease at least
produces chronic defects and is usually irreversible. Fifth, the hazardous substance is not left in the body in a way that firmly links the
disease or injury with the substance. 17 4 The paradigm of hazardous
substances is the occupational or environmental carcinogen. Substances such as teratogens, certain agents that cause chronic lung
76
disease, 17 5 and heavy metals that produce neurological disease'
exemplify these five characteristics of hazardous substances.
There are four methods for identifying carcinogens: 1) cluster
analysis; 2) short term molecular assays; 3) animal bioassays; and 4)
epidemiological studies. Variations of these methods are also used
to identify all other toxic substances.
Cluster analysis, which analyzes diseases shared by members of
a group exposed to a single hazardous substance, was the first
method employed to identify carcinogens. 17 7 Recent examples of
very rare tumors occurring in disparate populations linked only by
exposure to a common chemical are clear cell adenocarcinoma of
the cervix and vagina in women exposed in utero to diethylstilbes179
trol178 and hepatic angiosarcomas in vinyl chloride workers.
174
One of the most exciting areas of toxicology is the use of molecular techniques
to identify exposure. See Perera & Weinstein, Molecular Epidemiology and Carcinogen-DNA
Adduct Detection: New Approaches to Studies of Human Cancer Causation, 35 J. CHRONIC DisEASES 581 (1982); Perera, Poirier, Yuspa, Nakayama, Jaretzki, Curren, Knowles & Weinstein, A Pilot Project in Molecular Cancer Epidemiology: Determination of Benzo[a]Pyrene DNA
Adducts in Animal and Human Tissues by Immunoassays, 3 CARCINOGENESIS 1405 (1982)
[hereinafter Perera & Poirier].
Talbot has used many of the same elements to distinguish "environmental risks"
from "classic pollution." Talbot, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 207-08 (1978). I think that Talbot's dichotomy disintegrates, given
certain examples, and that it is best to maintain the more general definition of hazardous
substances.
175
Byssinosis, for example, is a chronic lung disease caused by exposure to cotton
dust. See Bouhuys, Schoenberg, Beck & Schilling, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Diseasein a
Cotton Mill Community, 154 LUNG 167 (1977); Merchant, Halprin, Hudson, Kilburn, McKenzie, Hurst & Bermazohn, Responses to Cotton Dust, 30 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 222
(1975).
176 A variety of chronic neurological diseases result from long term exposure to
lead. See Cullen, Robins & Eskenazi, Adult Inorganic Lead Intoxication: Presentation of 31
New Cases and a Review of Recent Advances in the Literature, 62 MEDICINE 221 (1983).
177
Percivall Pott used paradigmatic cluster analysis in uncovering the association
between scrotal cancer and chimney sweeping: he noticed a rare tumor affecting an
unexpectedly high number of people who shared a common exposure. Hermo, Chemical
Carcinogenesis: Tumor Initiationand Promotion, 2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1, 6 (1987).
178 The association of clear cell carcinoma of the cervix with diethylstilbestrol was
detailed in the early 1970s. See Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 170.
179
The association of vinyl chloride with hepatic angiosarcomas also became clear
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The second method for identifying carcinogens relies on shortterm screening assays. 1t 0 Screening assays are designed to test for
carcinogenicity prospectively and inexpensively. They are an initial
hurdle that substances must clear; those that fail are then targets for
further studies. Short-term assays are based on certain molecular
theories of carcinogenesis regarding the disruption of deoxyribonucleic acids (DNA). Similar disruption is thought to occur in
mutagenesis.18 1 Therefore, attention has long focused on the corre18 2
lation of carcinogenesis with mutagenesis.
A mutation is an abrupt and heritable genetic change. Thus a
mutation is any change in the genetic material of the cell that is
passed to following generations. This may mean a change in a single nucleotide (individual molecule of DNA), in several nucleotides
within the same gene (a functional group of DNA molecules within a
chromosome), or in an entire chromosome. Mutations may change
a normal gene into a mutant (forward mutation) or a mutant gene
into a normal one (reverse mutation).183
Researchers use several different types of assays. 184 These tests
in the 1970s. See Spirtas & Kaminski, Angiosarcoma of the Liver in Vinyl Chloride/Polyvinyl
Chloride Workers: 1977 Update of the NIOSH Register, 20J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 427 (1978).
180 See generally IARC REPORT, supra note 32; STRATEGIES FOR SHORT TERM TESTING
FOR MUTAGENS/CARCINOGENS (B. Butterworth ed. 1977) [hereinafter STRATEGIES]; CARCINOGENESIS AND MUTAGENESIS TESTING (J. Douglas ed. 1984); Ames, Identifying Environmental Chemicals Causing Mutations and Cancer, 204 SCIENCE 587 (1979).
181
Slater, Anderson & Rosenkranz, Rapid Detection of Mutagens and Carcinogens, 31
CANCER RES. 970, 971-72 (1971).
182 Although early studies failed to demonstrate this correlation, in the past 15 years
many laboratories have shown that most known carcinogens are mutagens. This then
justifies the assumption that the reverse is true: mutagenic agents are probably carcinogenic. See Haworth, An Overview of Short-Term Testing in CARCINOGENESIS AND
MUTAGENESIS TESTING, supra note 180, at 1, 4; see also Slater, Anderson & Rosenkranz,
supra note 181.
183
See Brusick, Consequences of Genotoxic Effects, in CARCINOGENESIS AND MUTAGENESIS
TESTING, supra note 180, at 17, 23-24. There are several specific types of mutations.
Point mutations are either base pair substitutions (one individual pair of basic chemicals
that cross link the DNA double helix are replaced by another pair of such chemicals) or
frame shift changes (several of the so-called base pairs are deleted). Id. at 21; see also
Ames, supra note 180, at 589.
184
Bacterial genotoxicity assays use large amounts of bacteria to identify mutations
following exposure of the bacteria to a chemical. For instance, the Ames test is a reverse
mutation assay using salmonella bacteria. Ames, supra note 180, at 589. There are also
tests that use E. coli in reverse mutation assays. Forward mutation assays and DNA
damage assays are less frequently used forms of baterial genotoxicity studies. See Mohn
& Ellenberger, The Use of Escherichia Coli K12/343/113 (X) as a Multi-purpose Indicator
Strain in Various Mutagenicity Testing Procedures, in HANDBOOK OF MUTAGENICITy TEST PROCEDURES 95 (B. Kilbey, M. Legator, W. Nichols & C. Ramel eds. 1977).
Mutagen assays can be completed using mammalian cells growing in a culture dish.
The genetic markers that demonstrate a mutation are usually related to drug resistance:
the culture becomes resistent to the normal effect of a drug and the mutant enzyme is
resistant to the drug's effects. Bradley, Bhuyan, Francis, Langenbach, Peterson & Huberman, Mutagenesis by Chemical Agents in V79 Chinese Hamster Cells: A Review and Analysis of

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73:469

have shown that 90% of known carcinogens are also mutagens. 8 5
Questions remain concerning how best to combine the tests to identify the substances that are mutagens, and thus presumably carcinogens. 1 8 6 At this point, short-term assays can roughly identify
mutagens, and presumably carcinogens, in a prospective and relatively inexpensive fashion.
The next step up from short term assays in terms of cost, expediency, and accuracy of identification of carcinogens is the animal
bioassay test. As the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC) has noted, "The essence of long term testing is to observe
test animals for a major portion of their lifespan for the development of neoplastic lesions after or during exposure to various doses
of a test substance by an appropriate route."' 1 7 Scientists assume
that substances that are carcinogenic in animals are carcinogenic in
humans-an assumption reinforced by comparing animal bioassays
and cluster analysis results.1 8 8 Animal bioassays, although conceptually simple, are quite costly, require two to three years to complete, and require the commitment of trained personnel and scarce
89
resource facilities.
the Literature, 87 MUTATION RES. 81 (1981). These types of tests have shown that some
known carcinogens are mutagens even when bacterial genotoxicity tests failed. Yet another technique that can demonstrate point mutation is based on a cell's ability to repair
DNA. Id.
Mutations occurring at a chromosomal level are detected by chromosome-aberration tests. Some mutagens will disrupt the structure of the chromosome, and these disruptions are observable using a light microscope. A special subset of such tests involves
drosophila flies. Research has characterized the lethal recessive genes on the drosophila
X chromosomes especially well. A mutation will allow expression of these recessive lethal genes-drosophila death thus marks mutagenesis. See Latt, Allen, Bloom, Carrano,
Falke, Kram, Schneider, Schreck, Tice, Whitfield & Wolff, Sister-ChromatidExchanges: A
Report of the Gene-Tox Program, 87 MUTATION RES. 17 (1981).
185
IARC REPORT, supra note 32, at 295.
186
The options are "tier" and "battery" testing. In tier testing, an agent is tested
further only if it is positive in a less sensitive test-a substance proceeds up the ladder of
tests to a certain point, where it is termed a mutagen. In battery testing, each compound
is tested in every test. See Butterworth, Recommendations for PracticalStrategiesfor ShortTerm Testingfor Mutagens/Carcinogens,in STRATEGIES, supra note 180, at 89, 90.
187
See IARC REPORT, supra note 32, at 24.
188
PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS: SUMMARY, 1985, at 9.
189

Of known human carcinogens, only arsenic fails to cause cancer in animals.

IARC REPORT, supra note 32, at 24. In developing an animal bioassay, researchers must
consider several factors. First, the researcher must carefully characterize the test substance, considering all possible impurities and special biochemical properties. Id. at 2830. Second, the researcher must carefully select the animal species. Certain strains of
mice or rats with known levels of normal tumor incidence have become the test animals
of choice. Id. at 30-32. Next, the researchers must select the exposure, preferably using
routes which most closely simulate human exposure. Id. at 33-35; see also Page, Current

Concepts of a Bioassay Program in Environmental Carcinogenesis, in 3

ADVANCES IN MODERN

TOXICOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER 87, 90-93 (H. Kraybill & M. Mehlman eds. 1977).
Perhaps the most controversial issue in constructing an animal bioassay study is the
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Animal bioassays begin with an initial hypothesis of the carcinogen having no effect (the null hypothesis). Thus, researchers expect
that in each treatment group, those not exposed to the substance
(controls) and those exposed to it will have equal numbers of tumors. The amount by which the experimental results differ from
the null hypothesis can be summarized in a "trend test statistic,"
which is simply the summation of the difference between the observed numbers of tumors and the expected (control group)
number of tumors.190 The trend test statistic can then be converted
into a p-value. 19 1 The p-value is defined as the probability of observing an apparent effect of exposure as great or greater than that
actually found if chance alone were responsible for any apparent effects seen in the data. Statistical significance is usually arbitrarily
defined as a p-value of less than .05; that is, chance alone can explain the results of the experiment only five percent of the time.19 2
If an animal bioassay is positive, meaning the substance causes
cancer in the laboratory animals, then researchers assume that the
substance is carcinogenic in humans. Researchers then attempt to
estimate the dose of carcinogen required to provoke the cancer response in humans. First, the researcher employs scaling factors that
compare the dose of carcinogens received by animals to human exposure. After determining the morbidity and mortality associated
with a carcinogen at a relatively high dose, the researcher "extrapolates" the data to a lower dose and mortality range. In order to extrapolate, the researcher must assume that the carcinogen dose and
cancer response vary in a consistent manner that can be described
by a mathematical equation. Researchers have proposed a number
of such equations or models. 9 3 If a good "fit" is found, the recarcinogen dose range. Scientific Committee, Food Safety Council, Proposed System for
Food Safety Assessment, 16 FOOD & COSMETics ToxicoLoGY, Dec. 1978, at 1, 101 (Supp. 2).
Scientists doing animal bioassays usually try to calculate a maximum tolerated dose
(MTD) from subchronic feeding and pharmacokinetic studies. This dose is usually proportionally much higher than the levels to which humans are exposed. This is necessary,
however, because of the relatively short life spans of the bioassay tests, and because of
the limited number of animals that can be tested. Once the study is in progress, animals
must be evaluated carefully on a daily basis. Any deaths must receive critical pathological review. The same is true at termination of the study period when the test animals are
sacrificed. See Saffiotti, Identificationand Definition of Chemical Carcinogens: Review of Criteria
and Research Needs, 6J. ToxICOLOGY & ENvTrL. HEALTH 1029 (1980).
190 T. COLTON, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 116-17 (1974).
191
This conversion assumes that the trend statistics from an infinite number of identical bioassays would simulate a normal distribution-meaning that they would resemble
a bell-shaped curve if graphed with one axis representing the probability of occurrence,
and the other representing the trend statistic itself.
192
See J. FREUND, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 387-418 (3d ed. 1980); T. COLTON,
supra note 190, at 115.
193 See, e.g., Brown, Fears, Gail, Schneiderman, Tarone & Mantel, Models for Carcino-
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searcher uses the mathematical function to calculate a response at a
given low dose.
Unfortunately, researchers can usually "fit" data from a given
bioassay to several models.' 9 4 A bioassay experiment provides a
limited amount of discrete data which, when represented on a
graph, describe a curve. If the graph flattens out completely at low
dose levels, it means that a further reduction of dose will not reduce
cancer incidence at all-the so-called threshold effect. If the graph
continuously declines as dose level decreases, it means that every
decrement of dose further decreases cancer response. Unfortunately any one experiment's dose/response curve can be simulated
by a number of dose/response models.1 95 Thus many models fit a
single set of data, ensuring controversy whenever such models are
used. 196
The fourth method for identifying carcinogens is epidemiology.
genic Risk Assessment 202 SCIENCE 1105 (1978); Crump, Dose Response Problems in Carcinogenesis, 35 BioMETlucs 157 (1979).
194
Certain assumptions and inadequacies attend each of the major dose-response
models. Each model has different implications for setting threshold levels of carcinogens.
The Mantel-Bryan model assumes that response varies in a normal distribution with
the logarithm of the dose. Although fairly simple to calculate, the Mantel-Bryan model
does not fit data particularly well. The curve it describes becomes very shallow at low
doses, thus underpredicting low-dose risks as compared to other models. See Mantel &
Bryan, "Safety" Testing of CarcinogenicAgents, 27 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 455 (1962). Just
the opposite is true of the one-hit model, which assumes that response is directly proportional to the exponent of the carcinogen dose: it estimates unacceptable risks at even
very low doses. See Crump, Hoel, Langley & Peto, FundamentalCarcinogenicProcesses and
Their Implicationsfor Low Dose Risk Assessment, 36 CANCER RES. 2973 (1976). The multistage model, a polynomial as well as an exponential equation, assumes a cell must go
through several stages before becoming cancerous. Because of the algorithm used to fit
the multistage model to data, the model has a diminished ability to predict dose-response curves that are flat low doses, but rise steeply with increased dose. See Peto,
Epidemiology, Multistage Models, and Short Term Mutagenicity Tests, in ORIGINS OF HUMAN
CANCER: BOOK C-HUMAN RISK ASSESSMENT 1403 (H. Hiatt, J. Watson & J. Winsten
eds. 1977). The multihit model, which assumes a cell site must be hit by a certain
number of toxic molecules before the cell becomes cancerous, requires the integration
of the dose exponent. This complex equation may generate very high safe doses if more
than one hit is required to initiate cancer. See Rai & Van Ryzi, A GeneralizedMultihit DoseResponse Model for Low-Dose Extrapolation, 37 BIOMETRICS 341 (1981).
195 At low dosages, the models tend to diverge and the experimental data failsresearchers cannot assemble a sufficiently large animal study group to allow calculation
of morbidity rates at low doses.
196 This is further complicated by the fact that the current understanding of cancer
biology does not allow discrimination between the models. As a result, many have advocated abandoning quantification of risks altogether, asserting simply that there are not
safe levels of carcinogens. See Robbins, Risk Assessment: Too Complex, Too Soon, in MANAGEMENT OF ASSESSED RISK FOR CARCINOGENS 59 (Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci., Vol. 363, W.
Nicholson ed. 1981) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF ASSESSED RISK]; S. Jellinek, On the
Inevitability of Being Wrong in Managementof Assessed Riskfor Carcinogens, in MANAGEMENT OF
ASSESSED RISK, supra, at 43; see also OSHA, Identification and Control of Carcinogens in the
Work Place, 45 FED. REG. 5002 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1990).
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Epidemiology applies statistical techniques and probabilistic reasoning to disease incidence. Epidemiologists study groups or populations of people and attempt to demonstrate statistically significant
correlations or associations between certain clinical outcomes and
personal habits, characteristics, or exposures to any number of variables.1 97 When directed at the identification of chemical carcinogens, epidemiologists usually describe groups of people exposed to
certain substances and compare these groups' health with the health
of nonexposed controls.
An epidemiological study, unlike an animal bioassay study, is
not really an experiment. Researchers cannot control the factors
that affect the quality of the data. Exact quantitative estimation of
exposure levels is usually impossible, and so dose/response curves
are extremely difficult to complete. Thus epidemiology contains
even more uncertainty than short-term assays, and animal bioassay

studies. 198
Epidemiological studies are either retrospective or prospective.
A retrospective study focuses on a group of people with a given disease and attempts to discern the factors common to the group. A
prospective study follows a group of people with a common exposure over a period of time looking for disease incidence. The best
example of a retrospective study is the case-control study; cohort
studies are the most widely-used prospective studies. 19 9 Cluster
analysis is a descriptive type of the retrospective study. Although
duster analysis reveals nothing about the nature of the substance's
carcinogenic action, the clear association between exposure and
rare tumors given by duster analysis usually leaves little doubt
about the substance's carcinogenicity. 20 0 Cluster analysis has two
major drawbacks. First, it is retrospective; cancers have already occurred when the cluster is noticed. Second, it has limited utility because the clear associations between substances and tumors that are
susceptible to cluster analysis are quite rare. Cluster analysis can
therefore identify only a small number of carcinogens.
The nature of an epidemiological study's attribution of carcinogenicity can be illustrated by outlining an epidemiologist's work in a
197

B. MACMAHON & T.

PUGH, EPIDEMIOLOGY:

PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 13-27

(1970); G. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER ON EPIDEMIOLOGY 1-5 (2d ed. 1980).
198 Epidemiologists are quite aware of the uncertainty involved in epidemiological
thinking, and of the nature of their causal attributions. See M. SUSSER, CAUSAL THINKING
IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 45-48 (1973); H.
BLALOCK, CAUSAL INFERENCES IN NONEXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 5 (1964); see also, Buck,

Popper's Philosophyfor Epidmiologists, 4 INT'LJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 159 (1975).
199
See generally D. LILIENFELD, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 164-67, 194-95
(1976) (describing methodology of retrospective and prospective studies).
200 For example, cluster analysis revealed cases of very rare hepatic angiosarcomas
in workers at vinyl chloride processing plants. Spirtas & Kaminski, supra note 179.
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given study. Consider, for example, a cohort study of a number of
employees in a particular hazardous occupation. The health status
of the chosen group is defined at the outset, and then followed periodically over a number of years while researchers record characteristics of work history and exposure status. Throughout the study,
incidence of disease in the study group is compared with that in a
control group-a group similar to the study group except for exposure status. The study ends at a designated time and rates of disease
occurrence as well as comparative risks of disease between the two
groups are calculated. With this data, the researcher tests for statistical significance, and posits whether the risk she has identified is
20
statistically significant. '
The information gathered in a cohort study of this kind also
allows the calculation of an attributable risk or etiological fraction
for the substance in question-that is, the proportion of all new
cases of a disease that are due to an exposure to a certain toxic substance. 20 2 Attributable risk calculation produces a percentage range
within which the proportion of disease caused by a toxic substance is
explained by chance only five out of one hundred times, provided
20 3 Of
that the attributable risk calculation is statistically significant.
course, exposure to more than one hazardous substance complicates such calculations because such exposures may be additive (risk
from one exposure adds to another) or multiplicative (risk from one
exposure multiplies the other).20 4 Yet, even in complex situations
such as the multiplicative relationship between asbestos and cigarette smoke exposures and lung cancer, researchers could still calculate an attributable risk.
Epidemiological planning and analysis increases the statistical
confidence that a certain exposure, for instance, to asbestos caused
an increase in, for instance, the risk of lung cancer. 2 05 It does this
201 See R. MONSON, OCCUPATIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 67-74 (1980). For a further discussion of confidence intervals, see infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
202 See Enterline, Attributability in the Face of Uncertainty, 78 CHEST 377 (Supp. 1980);
Miettinen, Proportionof Disease Caused or Prevented by a Given Exposure, Trait or Intervention,
99 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 325 (1974); Walter, Calculationof Attributable Risksfrom Epidemiological Data, 7 INT'LJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 175 (1978).
203 This assumes the standard for significance is .05. See Monson, supra note 201, at
70-71.
204 See Koopman, Interaction Between Discrete Causes, 113 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 716
(198 1); Walter & Holford, Additive, Multiplicativeand OtherModelsfor Disease Risks, 108 AM.
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 341 (1978).
205 Epidemiological planning attempts to eliminate bias from the study design. See
Sackett, Bias in Analytic Research, 32J. CHRONIC DISEASES 51 (1979). Moreover, epidemiologists try to uncover confounding variables that can obscure the truth regarding an
association. See Greenland & Neutra, Control of Confounding in the Assessment of Medical
Technology, 9 INT'LJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 361 (1980).
Several epidemiologists have elaborated a set of operational criteria that guide
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by eliminating the effect of other variables such as smoking, diet, or
increased age. Thus, epidemiology selects one condition from a list
of several, and demonstrates that it is associated with a certain injury in a manner that could be explained by chance only five percent
of the time or less-a probabilistic notion of causation.
B.

Levels of Uncertainty

A great deal of uncertainty attends the statement "substance X
is a carcinogen." This uncertainty is a subset of the uncertainty attending the statement "hazardous substance X has long term ill
health effects." There are several reasons for this uncertainty.
First, no deductive/nomological or mechanistic understanding
of cancer biology exists. Although science has begun to penetrate
the molecular puzzle of cancer, deductive conclusions concerning
carcinogenesis are not yet within its reach. Nor is current research
likely to produce immediate breakthroughs. 20 6 Second, the study of
chemical carcinogens relies heavily on statistical models and mathematical formulae. This includes not only the science of epidemiology, but also the statistical tests and risk assessment models used in
animal bioassays and, increasingly, in short-term assays. 20 7 Thus,
when stating that a chemical causes cancer, researchers use the term
cause in a probabilistic sense.
Research into hazardous substances involves three different
levels of uncertainty. An understanding of these levels of uncertainty can help clarify the nature of causation in science. The first
and most fundamental level of uncertainty concerns so-called transscientific issues. 20 8 Although cast in scientific terms, these issues are
not practically amenable to scientific resolution. For instance, scientists assume that animal models of carcinogenesis always apply to
humans, but limited resources preclude undertaking a set of lowlevel-exposure animal studies on all suspected carcinogens. However, all but one of the widely-accepted known human carcinogens
causal attribution. See, e.g., D.

KLEINBAUM, L. KUPPER & H. MORGENSTERN, EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS 32-34 (1982); see also Evans,

Causation and Disease: A ChronologicalJourney, 108 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 249 (1978).
206 In the field of toxicology, the most exciting area of research concerns exposure
issues. See Perera & Poirier, supra note 174. Tumor virus and recombinant DNA research promises new insights into the nature of carcinogenesis. See Israel, Helman &
Miser, Patterns of Proto-Oncogene Expression: A Novel Approach to the Development of Tumor
Markers, in IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN ONCOLOGY, 1987, at 87-104 (V. DeVita, S. Hellman
& S. Rosenberg eds. 1987); Yunis, Frizzera, Oken, Theologides & Arnesen, Multiple Recurrent Genomic Defects in FollicularLymphoma: A Possible Modelfor Cancer,316 NEw ENGLAND
J. MED. 79 (1987).
207
See supra notes 180-205 and accompanying text.
208
See McGarrity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogensin EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. LJ. 729 (1979).
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also causes cancer in animals. Most toxicologists therefore accept
animal data when better evidence is unavailable. The same is true of
the assumption that mutagenesis is a marker for carcinogenesis.
Although toxicologists cannot prove this assumption in a mechanistic sense, the degree of correlation is sufficient for them to accept
2 09
the proposition.
The second level of uncertainty occurs when human epidemiological evidence is preliminary, unconfirmed, not statistically powerful, or generally provides weak evidence for rejecting the
proposition being tested. Such evidence presents problems with
confidence intervals, which are arbitrarily defined as the range
2 10
within which the mean of a study parameter lies 95% of the time.
Of course one could set confidence intervals of 99% or 99.9%, or
any other percentage, but 95% confidence intervals correspond to
the usual statistical standard of p = .05 for significance.
To elaborate, the notion of a confidence interval derives from
the same principles that underlie tests of significance. In a normal
distribution, Pr (-1.96 < ( ,R - p)/(a/Vii) _ 1.96) = .95. This
means that 95% of the observed values of a random variable, R,
drawn from a normal distribution with a sample mean i, mean p,
standard deviation g,2t1 and a sample size of n, lie within plus or
minus 1.96 standard deviations of the mean. This can be rearranged algebraically as Pr (R - 1.96
p.
[/n_ R + 1.96 a/ii/)
= .95. This means that if one sets out confidence intervals of R ±
1.96 a/n, then in 95 out of 100 cases, or 95% of the time, the true
212
mean of the sample population will lie within these limits.
209
Another trans-scientific issue is the correlation of mutagenesis with carcinogenesis. Despite a high degree of correlation between known carcinogens and mutagens,
there is no way to prove that carcinogens are mutagens.
An example of the trans-scientific nature of animal studies is the carcinogenic effect
of the pesticide chlordane. On the basis of at least 11 studies in laboratory animals
regarding chlordane's health effects, the Pesticide Committee of the National Academy
of Sciences warned that chlordane posed a carcinogenic risk to humans. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AN EVALUATION OF THE CARCINOGE-

NICITY OF CHLORDANE AND HEPTACHLOR (1977). Yet there are not any complete studies
of humans exposed to chlordane that reinforce or detract from this animal data. See S.
EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 270 (1978). Thus the animal experiments, and the
leap of faith concerning animal and human carcinogenesis, are the only evidence available when considering the risks from chlordane. This, then, represents the most
profound level of uncertainty encountered by a finder of fact.
210

T. COLTON. supra note 190, at 126.

211 The mean of a sample is defined as the summation of all values, divided by the
number of values. Standard deviation is the square root of the variance. Calculations of
variance are usually based on the summation of the differences between the means and
individual measurements. More specifically, variance equals I (x- R)2/(n- 1), where R
is the sample mean. Id. at 31-33. As a result, the standard deviation grows larger when
there is a great deal of scatter, or divergence, in values of the various test measurements.
212 See id. at 126 for a discussion of confidence intervals.
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Confidence intervals are wide when n, the sample size, is small
or when a, the standard deviation within the sample, is large. Thus,
confidence intervals widen when few people participate in a study or
when a great deal of variance occurs in the sample. The 95% confidence interval reflects the statistical assumption that .05 is the
proper level for significance. Inherently conservative, statistics requires a less-than-one-in-twenty chance that random variation is responsible for the estimated value of the parameter.
Colton provides an example. 213 A group of one hundred cancer patients are treated with a drug. Previous experience with such
cancer patients has shown that the mean survival is 38.3 months and
the standard deviation is 43.3 months. The drug tested group has a
mean survival of 46.9 months. The confidence interval for the related group is 46.9 (1.96)(43.3/-f = 46.9 -" 8.5 months. If
the sample had consisted of 10,000 patients, then the confidence
intervals would be 46.9 + .85 months. With either sample, however, the mean of the untreated population lies outside the confidence interval, indicating significance at the .05 level.
Basing the confidence interval on a level of significance of .51
would decrease the size of confidence intervals, because the critical
fraction would be .66 rather than 1.96. However, the researcher
could then only state that the true mean of the population lies
within the confidence intervals half the time. Statistical inference
would find this amount of uncertainty with regard to the location of
the true mean of the population unacceptable.
In summary, developing a proposition to be tested, also called
formulating a null hypothesis, is essential when planning a study or
experiment that involves statistical analysis. The null hypothesis
usually consists of the opposite of the causal connection the researcher is attempting to prove. The researcher disproves the null
hypothesis by developing statistically significant evidence that the
null hypothesis is incorrect. Thus, the null hypothesis usually includes an assumption concerning the distribution of the data, often
that the data are from a normal distribution. Therefore researchers
expect the data to cluster about the mean in a characteristic manner.
When using relatively few data points or individual measurements,
the variance and standard deviation enlarge and widen the confidence intervals. In such a situation, although the evidence might
lead to a statistically significant conclusion and a rejection of the
null hypothesis, the wide confidence intervals detract from the
14
study's conclusions. 2
Id. at 127.
Id. at 125-27. For instance, a preliminary study may calculate that a toxic substance increased a risk ratio for a given disease, but the confidence intervals might be
213
214
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Wide confidence intervals indicate that the available data,
although supporting the scientist's hypothesis, are less than completely reliable. Wide confidence intervals occur when the research
included a relatively small number of observations, such as when the
number of study subjects is small; they also occur when the method
for making the measurements is imprecise, such as when exposure
information is limited.
The third level of uncertainty attends any individual attribution
based on group characteristics. This aspect of uncertainty is most
salient when the epidemiological evidence is well controlled, based
on large cohorts, and passes the various tests for bias. For example,
an extraordinarily well done epidemiological study of a rare tumor
and a clear exposure to a carcinogen for a large cohort of individuals might demonstrate that 45% of the lung cancers occurring in
this group result from exposure to the carcinogen. As to each individual member of the cohort, however, it is uncertain whether the
carcinogen or another factor caused the individual's lung cancer.
Epidemiology makes statements only about the group, not the individual. Individual attribution involves uncertainty, because the epidemiological data produce only summary statistics applicable to the
sample or to the population the sample represents.
C.

Case Studies

All three levels of uncertainty present distinct problems for lawyers and courts accustomed to causation expressed in terms of
causal chains. The court's ability to accommodate claims based on
hazardous-substance-induced injury may vary according to the level
of uncertainty that predominates. A review of several case studies of
hazardous-substance injuries and potential claims may help indicate
the kind of cases, if any, that a common law court could
accommodate.
quite broad, and the results proportionately less trustworthy. Similarly, the mathematical formulae used for dose/response curve extrapolations become imprecise at low
doses and result in conclusions attended by wide confidence intervals. See supra note
194. Yet another example of overly broad confidence intervals occurs when exposures
to potentially toxic substances or carcinogens are difficult to specify for a given population. Consider, for instance, a study of the relationship between chemical exposure and
occurrence of the relatively rare brain cancers. Over the past decade, several studies
have reported high rates of occurrence of gliomas in chemical workers. These studies
have been hampered by the researchers' inability to assemble a large cohort of workers
with precise exposure data and thus narrow confidence intervals in order to draw a clear
cut association. See Olin & Ahlbom, The Cancer MortalityAmong Swedish Chemists Graduated
During Three Decades, 22 EWvrL. REs. 154 (1980); Thomas, Decoufle & Moure-Eraso, Mortality Among Workers Employed in Petroleum Refining and PetrochemicalPlants, 22 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 97 (1980).
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1. Asbestos in the Workplace
In 1972, the United States consumed 808,554 short tons of asbestos 21 5 for use in a variety of industrial cloths, insulation, cement,
and composition materials. By the mid-1930s, both American and
British medical journals were reporting the ill health effects of asbestos. 21 6 By 1950, research had established an association between
21 7
asbestos exposure and lung cancer.
In 1964, Selikoff and others reported data on the mortality experience of a cohort of asbestos insulation workers. 21 8 In 1979, they
updated the mortality experience of these workers. 2 19 The insulators experienced a fairly consistent exposure to asbestos, estimated
at dust levels of four to twelve fibers per milliliter of air. 2 20 Of the

original 632 men registered as members of two locals in 1943, 478
were dead by December, 1976.221 Ninety-three of these workers
died of lung cancer. 222 Using age-specific United States death rates,
223
only thirteen deaths from lung cancer would have been expected.
The researchers noted thirty-eight cases of mesothelioma, with less
than one expected. 224 Total cancer deaths were almost four times
225
more than expected.
The overwhelming risk ratios, the ability to track an exposure
given membership in a union, and the completeness of follow-up all
contributed to the study's firm conclusion that asbestos causes cancer. The study has no problems with the first level of uncertainty:
no animal studies or short-term tests were involved. Nor are there
215

1 BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS YEARBOOK: METALS,

MINERALS, AND FUELS, 169 (1972).
216 See I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 23
217
Much of this history, and indeed the duplicity of the

(1979).

asbestos industry has been
documented in several asbestos products liability suits. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 209, at
89-96.
218 See Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 J.A.M.A. 142
(1964).
219 See Selikoff, Hammond & Seidman, Mortality Experience of Insulation Workers in the
United States and Canada, 1943-1976, in HEALTH HAZARDS OF ASBESTOS EXPOSURE 91 (Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci., Vol. 330, I. Selikoff& E. Hammond eds. 1979) [hereinafter Mortality
Experience]; see also INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF MINERAL FIBRES (J. Wagner & W. Davis eds. 1980); McDonald & McDonald, Malignant Mesothelioma in North America, 46 CANCER 1650 (1980);
Hammond, Selikoff & Seidman, Asbestos Exposure, Cigarette Smoking and Death Rates, in
HEALTH HAZARDS OF ASBESTOS EXPOSURE, supra, at 473 [hereinafter Asbestos Exposure];
Becklake, Asbestos-Related Diseases of the Lung and Other Organs: Their Epidemiology and Implicationsfor Clinical Practice, 114 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 187 (1976).
220
Selikoff, Hammond & Seidman, Mortality Experience, supra note 219, at 92.
221
Id. at 93.
222
Id. at 95.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
id. at 94.
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problems with confidence intervals: the exposure and disease are
well established in large numbers of people. The third level of uncertainty does, however, play a role: researchers cannot know
whether a particular lung cancer death is from asbestos or from
some other cause expected in any cohort of individuals. The tendency of asbestos workers to smoke and the multiplicative interaction of smoking and asbestos exacerbates this problem. 2 26 Thus,
the individual attribution of asbestos-caused lung cancer is difficult,
although the classification of asbestos as a carcinogen is
unproblematic.
Asbestos producers have turned this problem of individual attribution of causation based on group characteristics into an effective weapon in litigation. The producers argue that there is no way
to know if their product or the plaintiffs' smoking caused a lung cancer. 2 27 Plaintiffs could avoid this problem by presenting a case on
behalf of the entire exposed group. Each member of the class
would accept proportionate compensation based on the attributable
fraction derived from the epidemiological study. 228 Unfortunately,
such class action litigation often proves unwieldy and is chronically
hampered by problems with incompleteness of the class. 229 Thus, a
hazardous substance that presents only level three uncertainty can
still represent a formidable challenge to common law procedure.
In addition to such procedural problems, claims involving level
three uncertainty challenge the causal/moral nexus between actor
and injury that Epstein argues is at the heart of the tort theory of
causation. 23 0 In effect, resolution of level three uncertainty requires
displacement of the essential nexus from producer/injured individual to producer/injured group. Although conceptually possible,
this displacement would dilute the moral ascription aspects of tort
226

See Hammond, Selikoff & Seidman, Asbestos Exposure, supra note 219, at 481-85,

488; Meurman, Kiviluoto & Hakama, Combined Effect of Asbestos Exposure and Tobacco Smoking on FinnishAnthophyllite Miners and Millers, in HEALTH HAZARDS OF ASBESTOS EXPOSURE,

supra note 219, at 491, 495.
227 See, e.g., Martin v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 515 Pa. 377, 528 A.2d 947
(1987).
228
Class action or collateral estoppel doctrines are the best available methods for
assembling the exposed group. See infra note 266.
229 See infra notes 267-69.
230 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Rosenberg has argued that corrective justice can accommodate probabilistic evidence of causation. See Rosenberg, supra
note 3, at 877. I have argued that liberalism depends on notions of moral causation
such as Epstein proposes, and that this sort of causation is conceptually dependent on
mechanistic causal chains. See supra notes 71-107 and accompanying text. Although
meaningful in the context of personal injury, moral causation lacks this meaning in the
context of corporate liability for disease in a population of workers. This difference is
even more salient in a case of air pollution than it is in asbestos litigation. See infra notes
249-55 and accompanying text.
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litigation. 231
2.

Chlorinated Organic Compounds in Drinking Water

Halogenation of organic compounds produces a number of
useful solvents and degreasers. Unfortunately, many of these compounds are toxic. For instance, chloroform (CC14) produces neurotoxicity as well as epithelial damage in humans. Moreover, it
produces kidney and liver tumors in rats and mice. Trichloroethylene (Cl 2 = CH-Cl) and tetrachloroethylene (CC12 = CC12) are also
neurotoxic. In addition, both compounds produce hepatocellular
carcinoma in mice, but not in rats. 23 2 A cohort mortality (epidemiological) study of workers exposed to trichlorethylene revealed no
excess cancer mortality, although the sample size was rather
23 3
small.
In May, 1979, the EPA found trichloroethylene, tetrachloroethylene, and chloroform in two out of eight municipal wells
in Woburn, Massachusetts. 234 Subsequently, the Massachusetts
State Department of Health found a significantly elevated rate of
childhood leukemia in Woburn, with twelve cases diagnosed between 1969 and 1979 when only 5.3 were expected. A case control
epidemiological study failed to identify any etiologic agent for the
23 5
leukemias.
In 1982, a coalition of concerned citizens, in concert with statisticians from the Harvard School of Public Health undertook a telephone survey and a review of hydrogeological data. 23 6 They found
231
If tort theories provide no acceptable remedy, we can ill afford to adopt a donothing approach. A recent study estimated that 8,000-9,000 cancer deaths per year are
attributable to asbestos alone. Nicholson, Perkel & Selikoff, OccupationalExposure to Asbestos: Population of Risk and Projected Mortality-1980-2030, 3 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 259

(1982). If tort law is not the answer, then society must try another approach. See infra

notes 276-92 and accompanying text.
232
Craft, Solvents and Related Compounds, in ENVTL. & OCCUPATIONAL MED. 511, 520
(W. Rom ed. 1983); INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., 20 MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF THE CARCINOGENIC RISK OF CHEMICALS TO
HUMANS: SOME HALOGENATED HYDROCARBONS (1979); Weisburger, CarcinogenicityStudies
on Halogenated Hydrocarbons, 21 ENVrL. HEALTH PERSP., Dec. 1977, at 7, 9 (oral administration of halogenated hydrocarbons produced hepatocellular carcinomas in mice, but
had little or no effect on rats).
233 See Axelson, Andersson, Hogstedt, Holmberg, Molina & deVerdier, A Cohort
Study on Trichloroethylene Exposure and Cancer Mortality, 20 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 194
(1978).
234

MASSACHUSETrS

DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY AND

ENG'G,

SPECIAL ANALYSIS:

WOBURN, WATER SAMPLES TAKEN FROM WELLS G AND H BY MCCALL (May 14, 1979).
235
See MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, CANCER INCIDENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 1960-1978 (1981).
236
See Lagakos, Wessen & Zelen, An Analysis of Contaminated Well Water and Health

Effects in Woburn, Massachusetts, 81 J. AM.
cussing results from survey).

STATISTICAL A.

583 (1986) (presenting and dis-
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positive statistical correlations between access to water from the
contaminated wells and incidence rates of childhood leukemia, perinatal deaths, and two of five categories of congenital anomalies.
Researchers estimated, however, that the well water explained only
four to six of the ten to twelve excess cases of leukemia. All the
conclusions of this study were qualified by the difficulties with precise hydrogeological (exposure) data and the possibilities for bias
23 7
within the sophisticated study design.
Is the polluter who dumped three chlorinated organic compounds responsible for four to six cases of leukemia? The answer is
yes only if we recognize uncertainty on all three levels. First, we
must accept that the positive animal bioassays for carcinogenicity
apply to humans-a trans-scientific matter. 23 8 Second, we must realize that the inexact exposure data and possible bias within the
study design create confidence interval problems. In other words,
the epidemiology is inexact. Third, it is impossible to say which four
out of twenty leukemias the chemical exposure caused. Thus, data
on disease from an incident such as the one at Woburn involves all
three levels of uncertainty, even though the epidemiological study
itself is quite sophisticated.
Most salient in the Woburn example is level two uncertainty.
The report used very sophisticated and somewhat controversial
methods. The statisticians and epidemiologists who reviewed the
study did not unanimously approve of these methods or the conclusions reached. 23 9 Despite the high level two uncertainty, the
Woburn report represented a state of the art analysis of environmental toxins. Thus the question arises, will courts ever be able to
deal with level two uncertainty of this degree, or will courts inevitably fail to analyze probabilistic evidence and instead formulate a
240
causal chain explanation?
237
The report by Lagakos, Wessen & Zelen, supra note 236, was published with a
series of commentary articles on the report's conclusions. Many comments dealt with
highly technical aspects of the statistical methods used by the authors. See Swan & Robins, Comment, 81 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 604 (1986). Others suggested that the study was
tainted by bias, both with regard to recall, and with regard to the participation in the
study of subsequent plaintiffs in a suit against several manufacturers located in the area.
See MacMahon, Comment, 81J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 597 (1986). For a discussion of bias,
see supra note 205 and accompanying text, and Brennan & Carter, supra note 56, at 72
n.158. Still others noted the generic problems associated with doing cluster analysis
around toxic waste sites. See Rogan, Comment, 81 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 602 (1986).
These comments and the report they criticize form a comprehensive review of the difficulties encountered when working with environmental epidemiology.
238
Moreover, the Woburn report, by Lagakos, Wessen & Zelen, supra note 236, involved cancers that the compounds in question have never caused in laboratory animals.
See MacMahon, supra note 237, at 598.
239
See Swan & Robins, supra note 237; MacMahon, supra note 237.
240
The Woburn well contamination also demonstrates the difficulty of estimating
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Spermicides

Spermicides are chemicals used in conjunction with diaphragms
as a means of birth control. Because the effectiveness of these methods is low, each year 300,000-600,000 women become pregnant
while using spermicides either alone or with diaphragms. 241
Spermicides are absorbed into the bloodstream in test animals. 242
In 1981, a retrospective epidemiological study raised the possibility
of an association between vaginal spermicides and birth defects. 243
Since the publication of the original study in 1981, no less than
six studies have refuted the alleged association between spermicides
and birth defects. 244 Several commentaries have summarized the
existing literature and concluded that no association exists. 245
Moreover, one of the authors of the original study has reanalyzed
the original data and found no association. 246
The association between vaginal spermicides and birth defects
presents even greater level two uncertainty than does the Woburn
study. As a result of this great uncertainty, the majority of statistical
the threat to public health presented by contamination of ground water with substances
such as chlorinated organic compounds. The two wells were shut down only after these
substances were detected in Woburn well water in 1979. It is difficult to predict how
many other contaminated municipal wells exist. Moreover, the contamination at
Woburn was at least partly caused by toxic chemicals buried years before. These chemicals were uncovered during excavation for a construction site, and they prompted further investigation as well as the extraordinary community cooperation that made the
final epidemiological study possible. Thousands of such chemical burial grounds may
exist in the United States-no one knows for sure. See Developments in the Law--Toxic
Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1460, 1462 (1986) [hereinafter Developments].
241 Cordero & Layde, Vaginal Spermicides, ChromosomalAbnormalities and Limb Reduction
Defects, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 16 (1983).

242 See Chvapil, Eskelson, Stiffel, Owen & Droegemueller, Studies on Nonoxynol-9IntravaginalAbsorption,Distribution, Metabolism and Excretion in Rats and Rabbits, 22 CONTRACEPTION 325 (1980).
243 Jick, Walker, Rothman, Hunter, Holmes, Watkins, D'Ewart, Danford & Madsen,
Vaginal Spermicides and Congenital Disorders, 245 J. A.M.A. 1329 (1981). The report was
consciously hedged with warnings that the conclusions were tentative. Id at 1332. Another report identified an association between spermicides and Down's syndrome. See
Rothman, Spermicide Use and Down's Syndrome, 72 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 399 (1982).
244
Cordero & Layde, supra note 241; Bracken & Vita, Frequency of Non-hormonal ContraceptionAround Conception and Associationwith CongenitalMalformations in Offspring, 117 Am.
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 281 (1983); Mills, Harley, Reed & Berendes, Are Spermaticides Teratogenie?, 248 J. A.M.A. 2148 (1982); Mills, Reed, Nugent, Harley & Berendes, Are There
Adverse Effects of PericonceptionalSpermicide Use?, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 442 (1985);
Polednak, Janerich & Glebatis, Birth Weight and Birth Defects in Relation to MaternalSpermicide Use, 26 TERATOLOGY 27 (1982); Schapiro, Slone, Heinonen, Kaufman, Rosenberg,
Mitchell & Helmrich, Birth Defects and Vaginal Spermicides, 247J. A.M.A. 2381 (1982).
245
Bracken, Spermicidal Contraceptives and PoorReproductive Outcomes: The Epidemiological Evidence Against an Association, 151 AM.J. OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 552 (1985); Mills &
Alexander, Teratogens and Litogens, 315 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1234 (1986).
246 See Watkins, Vaginal Spermicides and Congenital Disorders: The Validity of a Study (Letter to the Editor), 256J. A.M.A. 3095 (1986).
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and epidemiological experts reject the association. Yet, the original
1981 study stands as the primary evidence of causation in at least
24 7
one court decision finding that spermicides cause birth defects.
Such a decision highlights the potential problems that courts encounter when faced with level two uncertainty and at least in part
explains their tendency to substitute fictional causal chains when
248
confused by the probabilistic evidence of causation.
4. Air Pollution Carcinogens
A number of carcinogens escape into the ambient atmosphere
as byproducts of industrial activity. The major carcinogens in air
pollution are arsenic, asbestos, radioactive materials, benzene, and
polycyclic hydrocarbons such as benzo[a]pyrene. 2 49 When attached
to fine particulate matter, such hydrocarbons are potent carcinogens
in animal models. Heavily polluted areas have much higher levels of
benzo[a]pyrene in the air. 250 Thus air pollution probably causes
cancer, especially respiratory tumors, in humans as well.
The link between air pollution and cancer, however, is very difficult to demonstrate, let alone quantify. Air pollutants diffuse rap25 1
idly in the environment after escape from industrial sources.
Thus, exposure to air pollution is diffuse, variable, and usually quite
low level. As noted above, the difficulty in quantifying exposure
widened the confidence intervals and diluted the certainty of the
247
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 744 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 437 (1986).
248
The similarity of the uncertainty and the attendant causation problems that arise
in the Woburn well contamination case and the spermicide situation demonstrate why I
analyze these quite different legal situations together. Well contamination cases, such as
the Woburn incident, spawn law suits that sound primarily in nuisance. Spermicide
cases are products liability cases. The causation questions they raise are similar because
both involve hazardous products.
Also, the spermicide question raises level three uncertainty: if spermicides have
teratogenic effects, they still probably only cause a certain proportion of the birth defects in all users of spermicides. Thus, the court would have to calculate an attributable
fraction and all exposed would have to receive proportionate compensation. See supra
notes 202-03.
249
See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REVIEW
AND EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR CANCER ASSOCIATED WITH AIR POLLUTION, at B-I
app. (1984) [hereinafter EPA REPORT]; L. LAVE & A. SESKIN, AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN
HEALTH 290, 339 (1977).
250
The animal data on the carcinogenicity of benzo[a]pyrene is quite venerable. See
Saffiotti, Cefis, Kolb & Shubik, ExperimentalStudies of the Conditionsof Exposure to Carcinogens
for Lung Cancer Induction, 15 J. AM. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL A. 23 (1965). The link to

urbanization and increased death rates is even older. See Stacks & Campbell, Lung Cancer

Death Rates Among Nonsmokers and Pipeand Cigarette Smokers: An Evaluation in Relation to Air
Pollution by Benzo-a-Pyrene and Other Substances, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 923 (1955).
See R. BRODZINSKY & H. SINGH, VOLATILE ORGANIC CHEMICALS IN THE ATMOS251
PHERE: AN ASSESSMENT OF AVAILABLE DATA (1983); see also EPA REPORT, supra note 249,
at 111-32.
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Woburn study.25 2 This problem is several orders of magnitude
larger with air pollution. In Woburn, the cross-sectional study involved a portion of a small town. In any study of air pollution, the
cross-section may involve an entire metropolitan area or several
metropolitan areas. 2 53 Thus the epidemiology is less precise.
The completed epidemiological studies on lung cancer and air
pollution generally compare the rates of lung cancers in various geographic areas. Urban areas almost uniformly have higher rates of
lung cancer, as well as higher levels of air pollution.2 54 However, an
attempt to control for the confounding effects of social class and
cigarette smoking complicates studies of the relationship between
air pollution and lung cancer. Nonetheless, one particularly sophisticated study estimated that ten percent of lung cancers in large cit2 55
ies could result from air pollution.
Imagine that a group of plaintiffs suffering from lung cancer in
Cleveland brought suit against the major industrial air polluters in
that metropolitan area. All three levels of uncertainty would undoubtedly trouble the court hearing the case. Although uncertainty
exists at the first level (benzo[a]pyrene is an animal carcinogen and
therefore we assume it is a human carcinogen), extreme uncertainty
exists at the second level (the very diffuse exposure-effect linkage
causes huge confidence intervals and thus low confidence in the
findings of a study that demonstrates the linkage). Moreover, uncertainty at the third level (individual attribution of cause) is profound
for air pollution, especially when compared to the uncertainty surrounding the effect of chlorinated organic compounds in the
Woburn water supply25 6 or Selikoff's study of asbestos insulation
See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
See L. LAVE & A. SESKIN, supra note 249. Schlesselman has discussed the
problems with a cohort study in air pollution. Schlesselman, Sample Size Requirements in
Cohort and Case Control Studies of a Disease, 99 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 381 (1974). Case
control studies on this subject are especially hard to complete. See Siemiatycki, Day,
Fabry & Cooper, Discovering Carcinogens in the OccupationalEnvironment: A Novel Epidemiological Approach, 66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 217 (1981); see also Haenszel, Loveland &
Sirken, Lung Cancer Mortality as Related to Residence and Smoking Histories, 28 J. NAT'L CAN252

253

CER INST.
254

947 (1962).

See L. LAVE & A. SESKIN, supra note 249; see also EPA REPORT, supra note 249, at

app. A.
255

See Pike, Gordon, Henderson, Menck & Soottoo, Air Pollution, in PERSONS AT

HIGH RISE OF CANCER: AN APPROACH TO CANCER ETIOLOGY AND CONTOL 225, 225-35

(J.Fraumeni ed. 1975); cf Winkelstein, The Relationship of Air Pollution and Economic Status
to Total Morality and Selected Respiratory System Morality in Men, 14 ARCHIVES ENmrL. HEALTH
162 (1967) (showing positive association between air pollution levels and total morality
in older white men when economic status controlled). Similar studies show higher lung
cancer rates in counties where smelters are located. E.g., Blot & Fraumeni, Arsenical Air
Pollution and Lung Cancer, 1975 LANCET 142.
256

See Lagakos, Wessen & Zelen, supra note 236.
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workers. 2 57 Pollutants like benzo[a]pyrene would cause at most
only one-tenth or one-twentieth of all lung cancers. Deciding which
cases of lung cancers air pollution caused would thus be very
difficult.
Certainly, plaintiffs in a class action based on injury from air
pollution would frame their suit very differently than plaintiffs arguing injury from spermicides. Nonetheless, the problems regarding
causation are similar because of the generic uncertainty involved in
the probabilistic evidence. Hazardous substance litigation may proceed under a number of different legal theories; but they pose similar causation problems. Moreover, any solution to the courts'
problems with causation must be broadly applicable. Having explained those problems and their relationship to the levels of uncertainty, I now turn to some solutions.
IV
SOLVING CAUSATION ISSUES IN HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE LITIGATION

A.

The Limits of Tort Law

Given the conceptual difficulties that courts have with causation
and uncertainty in probabilistic evidence, what role should tort law
play in the resolution of claims based on hazardous substance induced injury? Does tort law need to change to accommodate the
2 58
special legal problems posed by hazardous substance litigation?
Or should we abandon tort law for a comprehensive regulatory ap25 9
proach to compensation and cost internalization?
I believe that the answers to these questions are best found by
adhering to the architecture of uncertainty outlined in the previous
section. 260 Answers regarding level one uncertainty, that uncertainty that attends the trans-scientific questions about hazardous
substances, require policy decisions. 261 Scientific experiments cannot resolve such questions. Instead, assumptions are made that em257
258

See I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 216.
The primary advocate of changing the tort law system is Professor Rosenberg.

See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 924-29 (proposing tort law shift to proportionality rule of
causation and proposing extensive use of class action suits); see also Robinson, supra note
2, at 798 (arguing for further exploration of "risk" based, instead of "injury" based, tort

liability).
259
260

See SUPERFUND STUDY, supra note 6; Pierce, supra note 1, at 1320-30.
This focuses the scientific causation issues and avoids the problems with multiple

causation that also hamper hazardous substance litigation.
261
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. Level one uncertainty involves
trans-scientific issues-issues stated in scientific terms, yet not capable of scientific resolution. Examples of level one uncertainty include the applicability of animal models of
carcinogenesis to human beings as well as the role of mutagencity tests as carcinogen

assays. Id.
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body policy: animal carcinogens are accepted as human carcinogens
and mutagenic chemical are perceived as carcinogens. These assumptions, although stated in scientific terms, involve explicit policy
choices.
Can tort law cope with level one uncertainty? A common law
judge can decide policy as well as factual questions. Nonetheless,
the policy questions that arise with level one uncertainty are so
broad that poor resolution occurs through individual tort suits. The
benefits gained by decisionmaking at the level of common law
courts are outweighed by the anarchy that would result from reliance on an individual judge to decide whether, for example, animal
carcinogens should be considered human carcinogens. Solutions to
trans-scientific issues are only as valuable as they are consistent. Repetitive litigation of these issues in common law courts cannot provide this consistency. Decisions of this scope are best made at the
macro level of regulatory agencies, not at the micro level of tort
litigation.
What about level two uncertainty, characterized as confidence
interval problems? Any attribution of cause based on statistical or
epidemiological evidence involves some inherent uncertainty, best
expressed as the range of values within which the true value of a risk
of injury lies ninety-five percent of the time. This kind of uncertain
causal attribution is the best that the probabilistic evidence of hazardous-substance injury can produce.
Deeply troubled by this kind of uncertain causal attribution,
courts predominately adopt a corpuscularian attitude toward scientific evidence, expecting a clear causal chain analysis from science.
Tort law's emphasis on the nexus of the liable individual with the
injury he or she causes reinforces this expectation. 2 62 A tort system
underpinned with moral theory and liberal values cannot easily accommodate probabilistic evidence. 2 63 Indeed, a review of cases
dealing with hazardous substances demonstrates the conceptual dif2 64
ficulties that courts encounter with such evidence.
Level three uncertainty, that uncertainty attending individual
attribution of cause when the causal connection is based on group
characteristics, is also problematic for common law courts. This
kind of uncertainty also offends tort law's emphasis on the individual because the injurer/injured nexus is always uncertain. 26 5 Class
See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
Moreover, one would not want this type of evidence accommodated, as it would
dilute the sense of morality incorporated into a finding of liability. See supra note 103.
264
See supra notes 112-60 and accompanying text. This author is very pessimistic
about the successful resolution of hazardous-substance tort litigation.
265
See supra notes 77-99 and accompanying text.
262
263
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action or collateral estoppel doctrines, however, bring the entire
group of injured plaintiffs before the court. 266 Once presented with
the entire group, a common law court might be persuaded that jus26 7
tice demands proportionate compensation for their injuries.
Compiling these groups would not be a trivial task. Estimating
the geography of exposure can be difficult, more so for a suit based
on cancer from air pollution than for a suit based on cancer from a
polluted drinking water source. 2 68 Any legal solution providing
compensation for victims of hazardous substance injury must address these exposure problems. Class action tort litigation may be
an especially unwieldy method for compiling the group of victims
2 69
from any one substance.
Because tort law appears unable to deal with level one and level
two uncertainty, and deals rather inadequately with level three uncertainty, it makes sense to turn to a regulatory apparatus for resolution of the scientific questions that arise in litigation of hazardoussubstance injury. Tort law possesses certain theoretical advantages
over regulation; 270 however, these advantages in no way offset the
266 For a thorough discussion of class action doctrine, see Rosenberg, supra note 3,
at 910. Collateral estoppel also might work in hazardous-substance litigation. See Note,
Collateral Estoppel In Asbestos Litigation, 14 ENvTL. L. 197 (1983) (authored by Troyen
Brennan); Baldwin, Asbestos Litigation and CollateralEstoppel, 17 FORUM 772 (1982).
267
Rosenberg is fairly persuasive on this point. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 908.
See also Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV.
1143 (1983) (judicial interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1) preventing its use in mass accident
cases conflicts with rule's underlying purpose---efficient handling of numerous related
claims).
268
See supra Section III(C)(4). Hydrogeology is a very different endeavor. See supra
Section III(C)(2). Moreover, consider the problems with bringing together all the litigants suffering from birth defects after exposure to spermicides. See supra Section
III(C)(3). Any exposure problem leads to larger standard deviations and thus to wider
confidence intervals.
269
Indeed, courts hearing class actions have not generally accepted products liability claims. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.) (district court's
mandatory class-certification order vacated because appeals court found that it violated
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield LU.D. Prods. Liab. Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982) (due to complexity of issues peculiar to individual claims, class certification
denied to plaintiffs claiming injuries from I.U.D.'s), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
Products liability litigants probably have the smallest problems with proof of exposure
of any hazardous-substance litigants. If courts are wary of class actions in products liability cases, they will most likely be quite hostile to class certification in other types of
hazardous-substance litigation.
270
Rosenberg notes: 1)judicial independence prohibits the sort of political capture
that can occur with administrative agencies; 2) courts do not need full time expert staffs;
3) limitations on agency resources may preclude response to the many kinds of hazardous-substance injury; 4) tort damage actions are more discriminating than command and
control regulation; and 5) there is value in allowing victims to initiate claims. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 927. A properly designed administrative approach to hazardoussubstance injury can preserve all of these virtues. See infra notes 272-91 and accompanying text.
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fundamental problems that arise when common law courts are con27 1
fronted with probabilistic evidence of causation.
B.

A Regulatory Approach to Hazardous-Substance Injury

The problems with scientific causation in tort law demand an
administrative structure that provides scientific information on hazardous-substance injury. An administrative apparatus would free
the system from the strong tort law emphasis on the individual and
causal chain analysis. A regulatory approach that utilizes scientific
experts could accommodate probabilistic evidence of causation.
This in turn would produce the predictable outcomes that serve the
27 2
interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.
The structure of this administrative system is largely dictated by
271 Before turning from tort law altogether, I consider the possibility of designing
hybrid institutions that could assist common law courts with the difficulties presented by
hazardous-substance litigation. As noted, common law courts need help with the complex probabilistic evidence that links hazardous substances with injuries. In addition,
courts need some help assembling the group of litigants, in order to award proportionate compensation.
One way to accomplish these tasks would involve a screening panel for hazardoussubstance claims. Many states have employed screening panels to help deal with medical malpractice litigation. See generally Sohn, An Examination of Alternatives to Suit in DoctorPatient Disputes, 48 ALB. L. REV. 669 (1984). In the hazardous substance area, such
panels could consist of consumers, jurists, and scientists, who would review the available
evidence and reach some consensus on the probability of causation. Moreover, this
panel could oversee the organization of the exposed group, in order to present to the
court the proper group of plaintiffs.
Although attractive in the abstract, in reality constitutional and operational
problems have plagued screening panels. Some have argued that screening panels represent a loss of rights for plaintiffs, and thus have subjected the legislation to constitutional challenges. E.g., Note, Medical MalpracticeMediation Panels: A ConstitutionalAnalysis,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 322, 338 (1977); Learner, Restrictive Medical MalpracticeCompensation
Schemes: A Constitutional"Quid Pro Quo "Analysis to SafeguardIndividual Liberties, 18 HARV.J.
ON LEGIS. 143 (1981). Even when constitutionally permissible, such panels have largely
failed to expedite the litigation of malpractice claims. Indeed, in many cases, the panels
actually slowed litigation, without any real effect on the number or kind of suits brought.
Note, A PracticalAssessment of Arizona's Medical Malpractice Screening System, 1984 ARIZ. ST.
LJ. 335, 346. At least with regard to medical malpractice, screening panels do not appear to have helped solve any of the problems posed by tort litigation.
Hybrid solutions for hazardous-substance compensation and deterrence have been
offered as well. See Note, Tort Actionsfor Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental
Carcinogenesis,90 YALE LJ. 840 (1981). Many proposals before Congress include various
hybrid solutions to the hazardous-substance problem. See generally Kircher, FederalProduct Legislation and Toxic Torts: The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1116 (1982-83);
Schwartz & Means, The Needfor FederalProduct Liability and Toxic Tort Legislation: A Current
Assessment, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1088 (1982-83). None have won overwhelming support. In
the next section, I present a different solution to the problems associated with probabilistic causation in tort law.
272 Absent a legal structure that deals appropriately with causation, the United
States may eventually have to embrace alternative compensation schemes for injuries
from hazardous substances. See Developments, supra note 240, at 1634; see also Kinsley, Fate
and Lawsuits, NEw REPUBLIC, June 14, 1980, at 23. A silver lining to the hazardous-sub-
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the problems with causation and uncertainty outlined in this Article. 2 73 A "Hazardous Substance Authority" should consist of scien-

tific, enforcement, and compensation panels. A federal system is
most appropriate. A federal agency would efficiently deal with the
generic issues that arise in hazardous-substance-caused injury. 2 74 In
addition, a federal agency would provide the kind of predictability in
its determinations that industry requires. 2 75 A federal agency for
stance cloud may be that industry will exert pressure on the government in support of
national health insurance.
Under an administrative approach, Congress could order regulators to research
hazardous substances' detrimental effects on health. There would be unavoidable lag
time between the post-exposure onset of ill effects and the regulatory agency's ability to
detect and verify causation. With a federal regulatory system, victims would receive compensation as soon as their injury's cause was verified. Operating after the fact, tort litigation will always lead to concerns about the effect of moral hazard on manufacturers'
efforts to detect dangers in their products.
273
Indeed, I restrict myself to a discussion of the regulatory approach required to
overcome causation problems. Other hazardous-substance issues may require different
or additional mechanisms. Others have suggested examples of administrative compensation systems for hazardous-substance victims. See generally SUPERFUND STUDY, supra
note 6, at 196-246; Trauberman, supra note 1, at 250 (comprehensive model for state or
federal statute reforming toxic tort law by establishing victim compensation fund, financed jointly by industry and government and distributed on no-fault basis); Pierce,
supra note 1, at 1320 (proposing creation of federal "Safety Enhancement and Compensation Agency" for widespread compensation of accident victims and for safety regulation); Reed, Hazardous Waste Pollution: The Needfor a Diferent Statutory Approach, 12 ENvTL.
L. 443, 466-67 (1982) (advocating comprehensive federal approach to hazardous waste
problems, including compensation fund for personal medical injuries and creation of
federal toxic tort based on strict and joint and several liability, and modified causation
principles).
New Zealand's program, wherein no fault administrative compensation has generally replaced tort litigation, demonstrated the efficacy of such compensation systems. See
Marks, A Firstin NationalNo Fault: The Accident CompensationAct of 1972 of New Zealand, 47
AUSTRALIAN LJ. 516 (1973). A narrower approach, involving compensation of environmental injuries, exists in Japan. See Aronson, Review Essay: EnvironmentalLaw inJapan, 7
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 135 (1983).
274
Federalizing hazardous-substance-injury regulation and compensation could
greatly enhance the system's efficiency. With such an approach, a single federal agency
would collect and analyze scientific research on causation, aggregate personal injury statistics, and follow technological advances. The agency would rapidly disseminate this
information along with its conclusions to state and local governments, manufacturers,
and the scientific community; these parties could then fashion appropriate responses.
275
Much hazardous-substance litigation will involve federal jurisdiction based on
diversity. For example, most spermicide manufacturers market their products in all 50
states. In contrast, many hazardous waste sites, and the claims they generate, will involve state jurisdiction. One could argue that states and their voters should determine
the extent of liability for parties who placed hazardous substances into ground water.
See generally Hathaway, Hazardous Substance Victims Need a Federal Causeof Action, 14 ENrwL.
L. REP. 10,294 (1984). The federal government, however, has chosen to make this an
area of federal concern by passing several overarching regulatory schemes. Developments,
supra note 240, at 1470-76; see also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c)
(1982) held to pre-empt New Jersey Compensation and Control Act provision permitting state to impose tax to support cleanup expenses).
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analysis of hazardous-substance injury would also interact with decisionmakers at other federal agencies. This interaction would facilitate the development of uniform solutions to causation problems.
A Federal Hazardous Substance Science Panel would perform
three functions: policymaking, adjudication, and boundary-drawing. These three functions would deal respectively with the first,
second, and third levels of uncertainty.
In its policymaking role and in dealing with level one uncertainty, the Science Panel would consult with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Drug Administration (FDA), the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), and other federal agencies to develop a set of policies that address trans-scientific issues.
Presently, a good deal of consensus exists on these policies, at least
with regard to carcinogens.2 76 The Science Panel would codify
these policies and amend them as necessary.2 77 These policies
would then provide the basis for resolution of trans-scientific issues
in hazardous substance injury.
276
Fortunately, agencies have reached some harmony on level one uncertainty. In
1979, for example, experts from OSHA, EPA, and CPSC concurred on a set of cancer
principles, setting out the role of animal bioassays as well as short-term tests. WORK
GROUP ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERAGENCY REGULATORY LIAISON GROUP, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, FOOD AND DRUG ADM. & DEPARTMENT OF AGRIC., Scientific

Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, reprintedin 44
Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1979). Despite some minor tinkering by the EPA, these principles
remain in force. EPA Determination of Reportable Quantities for Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. pt. 117 (1987); EPA Designation Reportable Quantities, and Notification, 40 C.F.R. pt. 302 (1987).
Regulatory agencies' decisions regarding these fundamental uncertainties and policies are made only after the input of literally hundreds of experts through notice-andcomment rulemaking. Moreover, relatively affluent and very well-respected environmental lobbying groups can advocate an approach that protects the public health. The
resulting policies form the fundamental groundwork necessary to overcome level one
uncertainty.
However, the federal agencies may be too fragmented to continue to develop coordinated policies. See COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, AM. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL
REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 14 (1979); Tripp &Jaffe, Preventing Ground Water Pollution: Towards a CoordinatedStrategy to Protect CriticalRecharge Zones, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 15 (1979). In addition, the courts reviewing agency decisions are affected by the same
corpuscularian state of mind that influences courts hearing common law actions. See T.
Brennan, TheJudicial Myth of Scientific Certainty: The Demise of Generic Rule-Making
(unpublished manuscript available from author).
277 The panel could most appropriately achieve codification through notice-andcomment rulemaking, although delays in codification might necessitate the use of hybrid
procedures. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978); see also Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit
and the Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 345, 406 ("While 'hybrid rulemaking' may no
longer be devised by the courts under the APA, it will continue to flourish in a multiplicity of special statutes that modify the APA's dispositions .... ").
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As its second function, the Science Panel would review statistical and epidemiological evidence of injury caused by hazardous substances. The Panel would act as a "science court" and decide those
questions arising from level two uncertainty. 2 78 This adjudicatory
function would operate in two phases. In the first phase, the Science Panel would monitor scientific and especially toxicological
literature for studies suggesting a causal relationship between hazardous substances and disease or injury. In addition, the Panel
would review petitions from citizens, business enterprises, or community action groups aware or suspicious of hazardous-substance
threats 279
In the second phase of the adjudicatory function, the Panel
would consider the petition or agency suspicion on the basis of a
predetermined threshold for action. This threshold would incorporate priorities based on the quality of the evidence available and the
number of people exposed to the hazardous substance. The Science Panel would have three options. First, it could simply dismiss
the petition as groundless. Second, it could initiate toxicological or
epidemiological studies on the hazardous substance in order to establish or rule out causation. 28 0 As a third option, the Panel could
278
See generally Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 817 (1977) (endorsing goals of science court but expressing reservations about
potential impact of its factual determinations.); cf. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court", 75
MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977) (cautiously supporting establishment of science court and
setting out specifics for selection of judges, procedural matters, and opinion writing).
279
The panel would encourage these petitions, especially from business, because
they would represent good faith efforts to reduce injury. Litigants could use the petitions as evidence in a later proceeding about liability. Allowing citizens to initiate proceedings under the regulatory approach parallels the citizen participation that
Rosenberg cites as an asset of tort litigation. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 927.
280
In this situation, the Science Panel would also undertake ongoing medical
followup of the exposed group or a sample of the exposed group. For instance, consider a toxic waste site where there were suggestions of increased incidence of cancer
among citizens in the surrounding area. The science panel would initiate studies in the
area and also complete follow-up exams on community members. A regulatory body is
much better suited for this task than a common law court because the common law court
is poorly equipped to order and monitor such follow-ups.
However, some commentators have encouraged recovery in common law courts
from increased risk and fear of cancer. Note, IncreasedRisk of Canceras an Actionable Injury,
18 GA. L. REV. 563 (1984); Note, Emotional Distress DamagesforCancerphobia: A Casefor the
DES Daughter, 14 PAC. L.J. 1215 (1983). Some courts have addressed recovery for emotional injury. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184
(1983) (fear of cancer in itself insufficient basis for claim of emotional anguish); cf Howard v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 63 Wisc. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974) (no recovery for
emotional stress from fear of cancer). The agency could monitor and compensate exposed citizens if disease eventually occurred. This ongoing monitoring would allay the
potential victims' fears of receiving no compensation for their harm.
The Science Panel would obviously need a great deal of expertise, which the federal
government need not employ directly. The Science Panel could contract with academics
or private consultants for the design of appropriate studies, as well as for follow-up
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certify the evidence cited in the petition as proving causation and
establish the fraction of proportionate causation. 2 1 The Panel
would reach all of these decisions by consensus among a group of
scientists, consumers, workers, and business representatives on the
Science Panel. 28 2 These decisions would be subject to de novo re-

view on matters of law in an appellate court, whereas findings of fact
would be granted deference by the reviewing court. 28 3
monitoring of an exposed population. The government would, however, have to undertake the training of more experts in preventive medicine.
281
Equitable treatment for both plaintiff and defendant requires proportionate
compensation for injury from hazardous substances. The available scientific evidence
provides an attributable fraction of the injury caused by a substance in question. See
supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text; Brennan & Carter, supra note 56, at 58. This
kind of compensation should occur even if the attributable fraction is less than fifty percent, the number common law courts rely on when applying the more-likely-than-not
standard. See generally King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in PersonalInjury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE LJ. 1353, 1376 (1981).
Precedent exists for agency developed proportionate compensation calculations. In
1983, Congress required the development of "radioepidemiological tables" to estimate
the probability that a thyroid cancer victim developed his disease as a result of exposure
to a previous dose of radiation. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 7(b), 96 Stat.
2049, 2059 (1983). The commissioned study was published in 1985. AD Hoc WORKING
GROUP TO DEVELOP RADIOEPIDEMIOLOGICAL TABLES, NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH AD Hoc WORKING GROUP TO DEVELOP

RADIOEPIDEMIOLOGICAL TABLES (1985). Before its publication this report was reviewed
by a special oversight committee. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, ASSIGNED SHARE FOR RADIATION AS A CAUSE OF CANCER: REVIEW OF
RADIOEPIDEMIOLOGIC TABLES ASSIGNING PROBABILITIES OF CAUSATION: FINAL REPORT

(1984). The oversight committee had some problems with the assumptions used by the
Ad Hoc Committee, but did not dispute the concept of assigned share compensation.
Several other commentators have since reviewed the radioepidemiological tables, and
expressed confidence that this method of dealing with uncertainty is better than establishing causation through litigation. See Lagakos & Mosteller, Assigned Shares in Compensation for Radiation-Related Cancers, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 345 (1986). But see Council on
Scientific Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Radioepidemiological Tables, 257 J. A.M.A. 806
(1987). The regulatory approach can be generally compared with the common law
courts' efforts by contrasting the above articles with the decision of Allen v. United
States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). See also
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (struggling with admissibility of epidemiological evidence regarding relevant exposure to
Agent Orange and alleged related health problems).
282
There is a fear that this group would become overly politicized and that the decisions would reflect only narrow interests. Given the current state of tort litigation, however, all parties should agree that their interests are served by consistent and just
decisions regarding causation. More important, the independence of the Hazardous
Substance Authority is integral to its functioning as an alternative to tort litigation.
In establishing "p" values, the Panel would employ the standard statistical levels of
significance. "p" values of less than .05 would be acceptable and corresponding confidence intervals would be used.
283
Science Panel causation findings would present many of the same constitutional
questions presented by the existence of medical malpractice screening panels. The constitutional quid pro quo should be quite apparent in this setting. The inability of tort
law to accommodate the scientific evidence of causation in these cases necessitates the
science panel and its findings. See generally Learner, supra note 271.
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The third function of the Science Panel would involve describing the boundaries or limits of the "at risk" or exposed group.
Given the heterogeneity of hazardous substances and the nature and
number of injuries they cause, the Science Panel would set out
broad guidelines of exposure for injury-causing hazardous substances. For instance, with a hazardous substance such as asbestos,
the Science Panel could set the minimum number of months of exposure and degree of exposure to qualify as "at risk."284 For a
spermicide, the Science Panel could spell out the maximum number
of days after exposure when a mother was still "at risk" for bearing
an injured child. At a hazardous waste site, the Science Panel could
28 5
define the geography of the exposed group.
The determinations by the Science Panel could be used in a
number of ways. First, administrative agencies could use the information on causation and exposures in planning future actions. For
instance, the EPA could use the information gathered at various
waste sites to improve its handling of Superfund sites. The FDA
could use the evidence of teratogenesis from spermicides to develop
a set of policies about post-marketing testing. Thus, the data devel284
On this point, the studies on molecular genetics that record exposure could be
most helpful. See supra note 174. Adding molecular exposure data to epidemiological
studies would greatly increase those studies' accuracy of causal determinations. Without
this exposure data, epidemiology can sometimes be less than clear. See Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENvrTL. L.
REV. 429 (1983) (identifying problems with this type of evidence and recommending
guidelines for its proper use); Hall & Silbergeld, ReappraisingEpidemiology: A Response to
Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1983) (arguing that epidemiological studies
should play an important role as circumstantional evidence).
285 Again, a circuit court could review these decisions, but would defer to the Panel
on factual findings. The regulatory approach would require clear and strong Congressional language on the matter ofjudicial review. Without this strong language, the regulatory approach would only add to the administrative costs and delays. See U.S. GEN.

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DELAYS IN SETTING WORKPLACE STANDARDS FOR CANCER-CAUSING

AND OTHER DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES (1977) (details delays inherent in rulemaking procedures and offers suggestions for improvements).
Courts have reviewed the use of generic principles by regulatory agencies. The
Food and Drug Administration's policy regarding the review of drugs for evidence of
efficacy was the subject of a great deal of litigation in the 1970s. See, e.g., SmithKline
Corp. v. FDA, 587 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (review of FDA order denying new drug
application on ground that clinical trials were deficient under FDA regulations). The
OSHA Generic Cancer Policy was a thorough effort to abate exposure to workplace carcinogens. See OSHA, Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1990 (1987). The Supreme Court found OSHA's
effort lacking in several areas. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607 (1980). Nothing in either SmithKline or Industrial Union, however, prohibited
the use of generic principles.
Reviewing courts must appreciate that exposure definitions are not easily standardized. Every significant study presented to the Panel would require review to determine if
exposure data was meaningful. Unlike p values and confidence intervals, exposure issues are not readily quantifiable.
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oped by the Science Panel could serve both command and control
regulation and economic incentive approaches to regulation. 286
In essence, the Science Panel would complement and supplement the activities of the scientific investigation departments of a
number of federal agencies. Four major benefits accrue from this
duplication of efforts. First, the Science Panel's expertise in toxicology and epidemiology would allow it to approach hazardous-substance injury in a coordinated fashion. Second, the Science Panel
could develop a fully coherent approach to policy issues in science.
Third, the heterogeneity of the substances of concern to the Science
Panel would decrease the chances that one industry could effectively
"capture" the Panel. Fourth, the Science Panel would move beyond
general issues of quantification of risk and provide information useful to individual victims.
Litigants could employ the Science Panel's determinations.
Both plaintiffs and defendants could rely upon Panel determinations
regarding causation, attributable risk, and exposure. Of course, the
evidence from the Science Panel would not necessarily be determinative. The trier of fact would weigh all the evidence without granting special significance to Science Panel data.
The Science Panel data would serve three purposes in tort litigation. First, litigants would have access to probabilistic evidence
without having to pay for it themselves. This would lessen the inequities involved in litigation of hazardous-substance claims that pit
individuals against large corporations. Second, the Science Panel's
openly probabilistic evidence would serve to instruct courts in the
nature of probabilistic causation. Introducing the. Science Panel
data as evidence would force judges and juries to consider confidence intervals and attributable fractions, thus accelerating the
28 7
ongoing learning process.
Third, Science Panel evidence in tort litigation would highlight
the different evidentiary thresholds needed for setting prospective
standards and for assigning post facto liability. The Science Panel
may, for instance, find evidence that nuclear waste sites slightly increase the rate of thyroid cancer in residents living near the sites.
The risk, in this example, would be slight, but widespread, resulting
in a large number of victims with low attributable fractions.
This kind of evidence would be problematic for a court using
notions of moral causation, but straightforward for an agency interested in preventing such injuries in the future. Level one and level
three uncertainty are not as difficult for agencies to deal with as they
286

See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333

(1985).
287

See supra notes 122-70 and accompanying text.
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are for courts using notions of moral causation. In summary, Science Panel evidence would guide agency action without necessarily
being determinative in tort litigation. Common law courts would
retain their prerogative to judge evidence even as they grow accustomed to probabilistic causation and even as they determine how
large a role such causation should play in the assignment of liability.
Circumventing tort litigation altogether is another alternative.
The Science Panel could simply integrate their determinations into
an overarching system that would deter injurers and compensate
those injured by hazardous substances. A Compensation Panel
could employ both the criteria for exposure and the proportionate
causation fraction provided by the Science Panel, ensure that the
applicant's injury is of the kind caused by the hazardous substance,
and determine the amount of compensation for individuals. The
Compensation Panel would provide money to pay for medical costs
and also would provide disability payments commensurate with
28 8
those available through Social Security.
A General Compensation Fund would provide the compensation. Revenue for the Fund would be generated by a general tax on
industry as well as funds accrued through actions against producers
of hazardous substances. 28 9 Compensation for victims would not be
delayed by actions instituted by hazardous-substance producers
concerned about their liability. Once the Science Panel satisfactorily demonstrated causation, compensation would become
2 90
available.
288 The Compensation Panel would attempt to make the injured party whole once
again by providing for medical costs and rehabilitation. In addition, income insurance
would be available in the form of disability payments. In order to minimize this system's
cost, thereby rendering the approach economically and politically viable, victims would
not receive punitive damages or compensation for emotional suffering.
Although the compensation system outlined could be quite expensive, raising the
specter of the Black Lung Administration, opposition to the compensation scheme
would be unfounded. The Compensation Panel would not abandon causation as did the
Black Lung program. The Panel should at least ensure that the injury suffered by the
applicant is the type caused by the substance. The Black Lung program did not accomplish this. See Lopatto, The FederalBlack Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W. VA. L. REv.
677 (1983).
289
The compensation fund would resemble the clean-up fund established by
Superfund. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see Developments, supra note
240, at 1472. The Hazardous Substance Authority would promote compromise by taking a liberal approach to settlements with manufacturers. See generally Miller, EPA
Superfund Enforcement. The Question Isn't When to Negotiate and When to Litigate, But How to do
Either and How Often, 13 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,062 (1983).
290 This postponement of review is akin to that accomplished by section 104 of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982) before the 1986 overhaul of the Superfund program.
See, e.g., Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. Kan. 1985) (court lacked
jurisdiction to conduct pre-enforcement review of EPA's section 104 cleanups); see also,
Developments, supra note 240, at 1486-89.
The Compensation Panel would also overcome the problem of third level uncer-
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This comprehensive scheme would also need an Enforcement
Panel. The Enforcement Panel would cooperate closely with similar
sections at the FDA, EPA, OSHA, and the Justice Department in
determining the liability of hazardous substance producers for the
costs of compensation. Any awards in these suits would be funneled
into the General Compensation Fund. In this manner, the Enforcement Panel would attempt to internalize the cost of production of
291
hazardous substances to producers.
This comprehensive regulatory approach to compensation and
tainty by awarding proportionate compensation. Tort focuses on the individual and on
the causal chain from that individual to the injurer. In hazardous substance litigation
that chain is often severed, and the evidence available reveals only what proportion of
the disease in a certain group is caused by the substance. The compensation panel can
accommodate this probabilistic evidence and provide each injured party with compensation commensurate with the fraction of the disease caused by the hazardous substance in
the exposed group. This satisfies justice and morality without reverting to a focus on
the individual. The best available scientific evidence dictates this kind of proportionate
compensation. See Brennan & Carter, supra note 56, at 56.
291
The enabling legislation would establish the standard for liability used by the
enforcement department. Although there are several candidates, the main contenders
are strict liability and negligence. CERCLA's failure to set a liability standard resulted in
a great deal of litigation. Developments, supra note 240, at 1512. Litigation occurs not only
over the standard of liability, but also over the scope of liability and the nature of causation. Ia- at 1516-18.
Each choice for the standard of liability is buttressed by economic theories that
demonstrate the efficiency provided by the particular standard. Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure,and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14J.
LEGAL STUD. 689, 692 (1985); Schwartz, Foreword- UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 483 (1979). Much of this debate focuses on the role of what the manufacturer knew or could have known. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
UnavailablePriorto Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 757 (1983). This choice, a matter of
economic theory, is beyond the scope of this paper.
In addition to the liability standard, the enabling legislation should clarify several
other issues. First, the legislation should empower the enforcement panel to pursue
criminal actions against producers of hazardous substances who have acted in a grossly
or willfully negligent manner. See Elliott, Goal Analysis versus InstitutionalAnalysis of Toxic
Compensation Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357 (1985); see also Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857, 869 (1984) (discussing imposition of
noncriminal personal liability on management). Second, the legislation should encourage the enforcement panel to pursue settlements with producers. See Developments,
supra note 240, at 1504.
Finally, the enabling legislation should state policies regarding both producers'
bankruptcy and the retroactivity of the Sciehce Panel's findings. There are numerous
proposals dealing with liable parties' bankruptcy in mass tort claims. See Roe, Bankruptcy
and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Hoffman, EnvironmentalProtection and Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Toward a Better Compromise, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671 (1984). Similar
policies should cover retroactive liability determinations, a major problem under
CERCLA. See Developments, supra note 240, at 1540.
Finally, the enabling legislation would authorize the Enforcement Panel to collect a
hazardous-substance tax. A broad-based tax on industry is perhaps in order to help
internalize costs. Additionally, high-risk industries, such as oil companies and chemical
manufacturers, might be encouraged to contribute larger amounts to the General Compensation Fund.
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deterrence of hazardous-substance injury maintains many of the
benefits of tort litigation. 2 92 Indeed, replacing tort litigation with
the three federal Panels rather than duplicate the common law
courts with an alternative system of compensation and deterrence
makes the most sense.
The proposal for a Science Panel is nonetheless neutral on the
question of replacing or maintaining tort litigation of hazardous
substances. The Science Panel's determinations can be used to assist common law courts or can be integrated into an alternative system. To the extent that moral causation plays a role in both
preserving certain notions of liberal justice in tort litigation and in
assigning ex post facto liability, I argue that replacing tort litigation
with a comprehensive regulatory approach would be a mistake. Perhaps the Science Panel should ideally play a less radical, more advisory role. The Science Panel's data could instruct common law
courts about probabilistic causation and allow courts to reach a
compromise between moral and probabilistic causation. At the
same time, the Science Panel's information can guide agencies in
the design of more stringent regulation and thus help prevent future injuries.
CONCLUSION

Causation issues represent a major impediment to the successful resolution of claims based on injuries from hazardous substances. Tort law nurtures a set of causal concepts that emphasize
the individual and the elaboration of a causal chain from injured to
injurer. The evidence linking hazardous substances to injuries,
however, is largely probabilistic; forcing such evidence into a causal
chain model generates great confusion.
A federal Science Panel could alleviate problems that occur
when using probabilistic causation in the law. This Science Panel
could make rational decisions with regard to the three levels of uncertainty presented by probabilistic evidence. The Panel's determination would also aid common law courts and regulatory agencies.
Alternatively, the Science Panel could be integrated into a compre292 See supra note 270. The injured could still initiate actions, and damage awards
could be tailored to fit the injury. The Panel requires a full time scientific staff, but
contracting much of the work to university public health experts can minimize the
Panel's size.

Moreover, the Hazardous Substance Authority would avoid the usual criticisms of
regulatory approaches, such as those set forth by Trauberman. See Trauberman, supra
note 1, at 203-06. The Authority would not be fragmented, but would cooperate with
other agencies. The Authority would promote industry research into hazardous substance injury and reward prevention. Finally, the compensation process would be far
less time consuming than that of tort law.
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hensive system of deterrence and compensation for hazardous-substance injury. In either case, the Science Panel would help
overcome the challenge presented to legal reasoning by probabilistic causation.

